(Don\u27t) Take Another Little Piece of My Immunity, Baby:  The Application of Agency Principles to Claims of Foreign Sovereign Immunity by Roy, Daniel P., III
Fordham Law Review 
Volume 84 
Issue 3 Volume 84, Issue 3 Article 12 
2015 
(Don't) Take Another Little Piece of My Immunity, Baby: The 
Application of Agency Principles to Claims of Foreign Sovereign 
Immunity 
Daniel P. Roy III 
Fordham University School of Law 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr 
 Part of the International Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Daniel P. Roy III, (Don't) Take Another Little Piece of My Immunity, Baby: The Application of Agency 
Principles to Claims of Foreign Sovereign Immunity, 84 Fordham L. Rev. 1283 (2015). 
Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr/vol84/iss3/12 
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and 
History. It has been accepted for inclusion in Fordham Law Review by an authorized editor of FLASH: The Fordham 
Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more information, please contact tmelnick@law.fordham.edu. 
 1283 
(DON’T) TAKE ANOTHER LITTLE PIECE 
OF MY IMMUNITY, BABY:  THE APPLICATION 
OF AGENCY PRINCIPLES TO CLAIMS OF 
FOREIGN SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY 
 
Daniel P. Roy III* 
 
This Note examines the split among the federal circuit courts regarding 
the application of agency principles to claims of foreign sovereign 
immunity.  Specifically, a minority of courts have applied the doctrine of 
apparent authority in determining whether a sovereign is bound by the acts 
of its agents.  The majority of courts have, however, declined to apply the 
doctrine, holding that only actual authority is sufficient to bind sovereigns 
to their agents’ acts.  This Note examines the policy ramifications of the 
minority view through the lens of sovereign debt litigation, especially those 
conducted by so-called vulture funds, and ultimately concludes that the 
minority view should be explicitly disregarded via congressional revision of 
the statutory scheme governing claims of foreign sovereign immunity. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In November of 1983, Loydstone Jacobs, the Antiguan Ambassador to 
the United Nations (UN), signed a $250,000 loan agreement with First 
National State Bank of New Jersey, ostensibly to renovate the Antiguan 
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Permanent Mission.1  Rather than make any improvements, he sunk the 
money into a (seemingly ill-fated) casino venture, in which, perhaps not 
coincidentally, a number of Antiguan government officials were 
coinvestors.2  After payment on the loan ceased in mid-1985 and settlement 
negotiations failed, the noteholder, First Fidelity Bank, sued in the Southern 
District of New York and obtained a default judgment against the Antiguan 
Government.3 
Shortly after First Fidelity tried to collect against Antiguan bank accounts 
in the United States,4 Jacobs agreed to settle the dispute.5  But First Fidelity 
was paid only a fraction of what it was owed under the settlement,6 and the 
bank reinitiated its efforts to attach the Antiguan bank accounts.7  In 
response, the Antiguan Government challenged the original default 
judgment on the basis of foreign sovereign immunity.8  It argued that, under 
Antiguan law, Jacobs lacked authority to borrow the $250,000 and to waive 
its sovereign immunity.9  The district court disagreed: agency principles 
made Antigua liable for Jacobs’s acts.10  Antigua appealed to the Second 
Circuit.11 
While the Second Circuit declined to reach the merits in First Fidelity 
Bank v. Government of Antigua and Barbuda,12 it held that a sovereign may 
be bound to a commercial transaction where its agent acts with apparent 
authority.13  Other circuit courts, including the Ninth,14 Fourth,15 and 
Fifth,16 reject this position.  They hold that a sovereign is bound to a 
commercial agreement only where its agent acts with actual authority.17 
 
 1. First Fidelity Bank v. Gov’t of Antigua & Barbuda, 877 F.2d 189, 191 (2d Cir. 
1989). 
 2. Id. at 197 (Newman, J., dissenting). 
 3. Id. at 191 (majority opinion). 
 4. Id. 
 5. Id.  This settlement agreement contained a complete waiver of sovereign immunity. 
Id.  Jacobs claimed that the Permanent Secretary to the Antiguan Prime Minister had 
previously authorized him to enter into such a settlement agreement. Id.  Thus, Jacobs signed 
the agreement in his capacity as Ambassador, while Robert Healy, in-house counsel for the 
Antiguan Permanent Mission to the UN, signed as the government’s attorney. Id. Antigua 
denied that Jacobs and Healy were ever authorized to enter into such an agreement. Id. 
 6. Id. 
 7. Id. 
 8. Id.  This was the first official action taken by the Antiguan Government in the course 
of the litigation. Id. 
 9. Id. at 197 (Newman, J., dissenting). 
 10. Id. at 191 (majority opinion). 
 11. Id. 
 12. 877 F.2d 189 (2d Cir. 1989).  The court vacated the prior default judgment and 
remanded the case to the district court for further factual proceedings consonant with its 
rulemaking. Id. at 196. 
 13. See id. at 193–95. 
 14. Phaneuf v. Republic of Indonesia, 106 F.3d 302 (9th Cir. 1997). 
 15. Velasco v. Gov’t of Indonesia, 370 F.3d 392 (4th Cir. 2004). 
 16. Dale v. Colagiovanni, 443 F.3d 425 (5th Cir. 2006). 
 17. Id. at 428–30; Velasco, 370 F.3d at 400; Phaneuf, 106 F.3d at 307–08. 
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The ramifications of this circuit split are manifold.  For example, 
sovereign debt litigation over agreements with highly indebted states18 or 
with authoritarian regimes frequently turn on the decision to apply actual or 
apparent authority doctrine.19  The minority position would extend liability 
to sovereigns via the doctrine of apparent authority and produce judgments 
with catastrophic economic effects for many troubled states.20  Moreover, it 
would have disconcerting doctrinal implications21 and threaten U.S. foreign 
policy goals.22  In contrast, the majority position would result in greater 
predictability of decisions, as well as the preservation of foreign sovereign 
immunity.23  It would, however, function to the detriment of contractual 
sanctity and global creditors.24 
Part I of this Note examines the bedrock principles of agency law, the 
doctrine of foreign sovereign immunity, and how the two areas of law 
intersect.  Part II then analyzes how courts apply these principles by 
explicating the methodologies and justifications for adopting the minority 
or majority position.  Part III considers the doctrinal and policy 
ramifications of the minority and majority positions and ultimately proposes 
that Congress remedy the split via revision of the current statutory scheme.  
Absent congressional action, this Note proposes a judicial remedy. 
I.  STRANGE BEDFELLOWS?:  AGENCY PRINCIPALS, 
THE DOCTRINE OF FOREIGN SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY, 
AND THEIR INTERSECTION 
This Note begins, in Part I.A, by examining the general principles of 
agency law implicated in this circuit split.  Part I.B then addresses the 
historical development of the doctrine of foreign sovereign immunity, up to 
and including the codification of the modern standard in the form of the 
Federal Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 (FSIA).  In turn, Part I.C focuses 
specifically on the FSIA’s commercial activity exception, illustrating how 
commercial transactions may affect claims of sovereign immunity in U.S. 
courts.  Lastly, Part I.D demonstrates how the agency principles identified 
in Part I.A are applied in the foreign sovereign immunity claims discussed 
in Parts I.B and I.C, particularly in the context of sovereign debt litigation. 
 
 18. See, e.g., Themis Capital, LLC v. Democratic Republic of Congo (Themis Capital I), 
881 F. Supp. 2d 508 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (centering on the renewal of a debt restructuring 
agreement by government officials of the Democratic Republic of Congo). 
 19. See, e.g., Velasco, 370 F.3d at 392 (involving the issuance of promissory notes by an 
organ of the Indonesian security apparatus under the Suharto dictatorship). 
 20. See Elizabeth Broomfield, Subduing the Vultures:  Assessing Government Caps on 
Recovery in Sovereign Debt Litigation, 2010 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 473, 493–94 
(highlighting the impact of vulture fund litigation on Liberia, a politically and economically 
troubled African state that was ordered to pay a sum equivalent to 5 percent of its 2009 
annual budget to two funds by a British court). 
 21. See infra Part III.A. 
 22. See infra Part III.B. 
 23. See infra Part III.A–B. 
 24. See Daniel E. Murray, Phaneuf v. Republic of Indonesia, 106 F.3d 302 (9th Cir. 
1997), 91 AM. J. INT’L L. 738, 739 (1997) (discussing the problematic nature of the Ninth 
Circuit’s refusal to apply the doctrine of apparent authority). 
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A.  Agency Principles 
Part I.A.1 of this Note examines general principles of agency law, 
including how agency relationships are formed and the duties of the actors 
involved.  Having reviewed these foundational principles, Part I.A.2 
investigates how agents bind third parties to their actions, specifically via 
the doctrines of actual and apparent authority.  Finally, Part I.A.3 surveys 
equitable doctrines relating to the binding power of agents, specifically the 
doctrine of inherent authority and the more modern doctrine of agency by 
estoppel. 
1.  The Agency Relationship 
The term “agency” refers to the fiduciary relationship wherein one party 
empowers another party to transact some business on its behalf.25  This 
relationship, also known as the principal-agent relationship, is essentially 
consensual.26  It is created when one individual or entity (the principal) 
manifests assent that another individual or entity (the agent) shall act on the 
principal’s behalf and remain subject to his control, and the agent manifests 
his assent to that arrangement as well.27  Once an agency relationship is 
established, the agent is empowered to bring about, or alter, business and 
legal relationships between the principal and third persons.28  However, the 
agent also has a fiduciary duty to act loyally in the principal’s interest in all 
matters connected to the agency relationship.29 
Agency relationships appear within a broad range of industries and under 
various circumstances.30  Elements of traditional agency law may, for 
instance, be found in “relationships between employer and employee, 
corporation and officer, client and lawyer, and partnership and general 
partner.”31  Indeed, employer-employee relationships generally can be 
thought of as falling under the wider umbrella of agency law.32  Thus, 
employees, acting as agents, may bind their employers, as principals, to 
contracts falling within the scope of their employment,33 including in 
certain instances to debt instruments.34 
 
 25. 3 AM. JUR. 2D Agency § 1 (2014). 
 26. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.01 cmt. c (AM. LAW INST. 2006). 
 27. Gen. Bldg. Contractors Ass’n v. Pennsylvania, 458 U.S. 375, 392 (1982) (quoting 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 1 (AM. LAW INST. 1958)); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF 
AGENCY § 1.01 (AM. LAW INST. 2006).  These manifestations may be written or oral, or 
communicated via conduct. Id. § 1.03; 3 AM. JUR. 2D, supra note 25, Agency § 1 n.4. 
 28. 3 AM. JUR. 2D, supra note 25, Agency § 2. 
 29. Id. 
 30. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.01 cmt. c (AM. LAW INST. 2006). 
 31. Id. 
 32. 27 AM. JUR. 2D, supra note 25, Employment Relationship § 3. 
 33. See, e.g., Northrop Grumman Ship Sys., Inc. v. Ministry of Def. of Republic of 
Venez., 575 F.3d 491 (5th Cir. 2009) (applying Mississippi law in determining whether an 
attorney acting for the Republic of Venezuela had the authority to enter into a settlement 
agreement); Essco Geometric v. Harvard Indus., 46 F.3d 718 (8th Cir. 1995) (deciding 
whether a purchasing agent had sufficient authority to enter into two-year, exclusive 
contract); Six Flags, Inc. v. Steadfast Ins. Co., 474 F. Supp. 2d 201 (D. Mass. 2007) 
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2.  Actual Authority Vs. Apparent Authority 
An agent may act, and consequently bind a principal, pursuant to 
different types of authority.35  The first is actual authority.36  An agent has 
actual authority when the principal, either expressly or impliedly, authorizes 
him to act in a certain matter.37  The existence of actual authority depends 
on manifestations of consent between the principal and agent, and the agent 
must reasonably believe that the principal wishes him to act on his behalf.38  
An agent has actual authority to take actions reasonably designated or 
implied by the principal’s manifestations.39  Moreover, an agent has actual 
authority to undertake any acts necessary or incidental to attaining the 
principal’s manifested goals.40 
Second, an agent may bind a principal under the doctrine of apparent 
authority, which is based on notions of estoppel.41  Apparent authority 
exists where a third party reasonably believes an agent has the authority to 
act on the principal’s behalf, based on the principal’s own manifestations to 
the third party.42  In this way, the doctrine requires determinations 
regarding not only the subjective beliefs of third parties, but also the 
reasonableness of such beliefs.43 
Thus, an agent acting with apparent authority may bind a principal to a 
transaction with a third party, even where the principal has not actually 
authorized him to do so.44  However, the third party’s reliance must be both 
reasonable and in good faith,45 and, consequently, a principal will not be 
 
(concluding that an executive of a water ride manufacturer had the authority to bind the 
manufacturer to a contract with an amusement park). 
 34. See, e.g., Themis Capital I, 881 F. Supp. 2d 508 (S.D.N.Y. 2012). 
 35. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY §§ 2.01–.02 (AM. LAW INST. 2006) 
(addressing different types of authority). 
 36. Id. § 2.01. 
 37. 2A C.J.S. Agency § 8 (2014). 
 38. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 2.01 (AM. LAW INST. 2006). 
 39. Id. § 2.02. 
 40. Id. 
 41. 2A C.J.S., supra note 37, Agency § 8. 
 42. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 2.03 (AM. LAW INST. 2006).  The existence of 
some manifestation to a third party is the essential element to the creation of apparent 
authority, id. § 3.03, as opposed to actual authority, which requires some manifestation 
between the principal and agent themselves. Id. § 2.01. 
 43. While the application of the doctrine of apparent authority varies slightly by 
jurisdiction, many jurisdictions explicitly note this requirement of subjective belief. See 
Myers v. Bennett Law Offices, 238 F.3d 1068, 1073 n.2 (9th Cir. 2001) (“A party claiming 
apparent authority of an agent must prove (1) that the acting party subjectively believed that 
the agent had authority to act for the principal and (2) that the subjective belief in the agent’s 
authority was objectively reasonable.”); Poly-Am., Inc. v. NLRB, 260 F.3d 465, 480 (5th 
Cir. 2001). But cf. Ja Dan, Inc. v. L-J, Inc., 898 F. Supp. 894, 900 (S.D. Fla. 1995) 
(“Apparent authority does not arise from the subjective understanding of the person dealing 
with the purported agent . . . .”). 
 44. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 2.03 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 2006); 2A C.J.S., 
supra note 37, Agency § 8. 
 45. 2A C.J.S., supra note 37, Agency § 159. 
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bound by an unauthorized act if the third party knew, or had actual or 
constructive notice of, the agent’s lack of authority.46 
3.  Inherent Authority Vs. Agency by Estoppel 
In limited circumstances, a principal may be bound to a transaction 
authorized by an agent via the doctrine of inherent agency power.47  
Inherent agency power refers to the power of an agent to bind a principal 
that is derived not from authority, actual or apparent, but rather from the 
agency relationship itself.48  Inherent agency power may, consequently, 
exist in the absence of any manifestation from the principal to a third 
party,49 distinguishing it from apparent authority.50  Therefore, inherent 
agency power works to protect especially innocent or disadvantaged third 
parties, often in the context of tort liability or the loss of property caused by 
improper agent action.51 
The Restatement (Third) of Agency has, however, rejected this notion of 
inherent agency power.52  It instead argues that other related aspects of 
agency law encompass the doctrine’s concerns, principally the doctrine of 
agency by estoppel.53  Specifically, this doctrine provides that the principal 
will be liable where a third party has justifiably relied, and acted to their 
detriment, upon the belief that an actor is an agent of the principal.54  The 
principal must, however, have intentionally or recklessly caused this belief, 
or had notice of such belief and failed to take reasonable steps to notify the 
third party.55  Therefore, “[t]he operative question is whether a reasonable 
person in the position of the third party would believe such an agent, as the 
actor appears to be, to have authority to do a particular act.”56  In this way, 
the doctrine likewise seeks to protect disadvantaged third parties, absent 
any concrete manifestations from the principal to a third party.57 
B.  Foreign Sovereign Immunity 
Part I.B.1 begins by broadly defining the doctrine of foreign sovereign 
immunity.  Next, Part I.B.2 discusses the traditional theory of foreign 
sovereign immunity, known as the absolute theory of sovereign immunity, 
in greater detail.  In turn, Part I.B.3 looks to the more modern theory of 
restrictive foreign sovereign immunity.  Finally, Part I.B.4 examines the 
modern statutory codification of the doctrine of foreign sovereign immunity 
in the FSIA. 
 
 46. Id. § 167. 
 47. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 8A (AM. LAW INST. 1958). 
 48. Id. 
 49. See id. 
 50. See supra note 42 and accompanying text. 
 51. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 8A cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 1958). 
 52. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 2.01 cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 2006). 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. § 2.05. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. § 2.05 cmt. c. 
 57. Id. § 2.05 cmt. d. 
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1.  The Doctrine of Foreign Sovereign Immunity 
The doctrine of foreign sovereign immunity embodies the general 
principle of international law that a foreign government, including its agents 
and instrumentalities, shall not be subject to the jurisdiction of another 
state’s domestic courts, absent its consent.58  This doctrine has deep roots, 
stretching back to the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648, which itself laid the 
grounds for the current international, or Westphalian, system.59  Sovereign 
immunity is understood to naturally flow from the bedrock principles of this 
system,60 namely the inviolability and equality of sovereign states,61 in that 
it requires a nation’s sovereignty, or its “political independence and power 
to conduct internal matters without outside interference,” to be universally 
respected.62 
While the doctrine may have originated in the era of individual 
monarchs, it has been widely retained across the globe in various forms.63  
Some nations adhere rigidly to the traditional formulation of foreign 
sovereign immunity, but the majority of nations today, including most 
European nations and the United States, have enacted more flexible 
versions of the doctrine in order to reflect the realities of the modern 
globalized world.64 
2.  The Ancien Régime:  
The Absolute Theory of Sovereign Immunity 
For much of U.S. history, foreign sovereigns were accorded complete 
immunity from domestic courts under the theory of absolute sovereign 
immunity, which in essence provides that “a foreign state [may] not be sued 
whatsoever without its consent.”65  The basis for this theory was first 
elucidated over two centuries ago in Schooner Exchange v. McFadden,66 
where Chief Justice John Marshall concluded that an armed French naval 
vessel docked in Philadelphia was immune from the jurisdiction of U.S. 
courts.67  The Chief Justice reasoned that such immunity was generally 
 
 58. See Andrew B. Pittman, Ambassadorial Waiver of Foreign State Sovereign Immunity 
to Domestic Adjudication in United States Courts, 58 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 645, 647 (2001). 
 59. See David P. Vandenberg, In the Wake of Republic of Austria v. Altmann:  The 
Current Status of Foreign Immunity in United States Courts, 77 U. COLO. L. REV. 739, 740 
(2006). 
 60. See id. (“The international law doctrine of foreign sovereign immunity was born as 
an organic byproduct of the current international system.”). 
 61. Pittman, supra note 58, at 650. 
 62. Vandenberg, supra note 59, at 740. 
 63. See Victory Transp. Inc. v. Comisaria General de Abastecimientos y Transportes, 
336 F.2d 354, 356–58 (2d Cir. 1964) (noting the existence of both a traditional formulation 
of the doctrine, as well as a more modern version adopted by a number of states). 
 64. See Vandenberg, supra note 59, at 741–42 (“However, courts in many other states—
most notably the traditional European powers—began denying immunity in cases where the 
state was sued for activities of a mere commercial or private nature.”). 
 65. Int’l Ass’n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers v. Org. of Petroleum Exp. 
Countries, 477 F. Supp. 553, 565 (C.D. Cal. 1979). 
 66. 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812). 
 67. Id. at 147. 
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recognized under the law of nations.68  While this opinion could have been 
read narrowly to apply only in the realm of governmental or military action, 
lower courts construed it broadly to extend immunity to commercial 
transactions.69  The Supreme Court later explicitly adopted this expansive 
theory of immunity in the 1926 case Berrizi Bros. Co. v. The Pesaro.70 
However, the Court also made it clear that the bestowal of immunity was 
a “matter of grace and comity.”71  Therefore, a two-step procedure 
developed for those sovereigns seeking immunity.72  The first step required 
the sovereign’s diplomatic representative to seek a formal suggestion of 
immunity from the U.S. State Department.73  Secondly, if the State 
Department granted the request, the court would decline to exercise 
jurisdiction.74  During this period, however, the usual policy of the 
executive branch was simply to request immunity for all (friendly) 
nations.75 
3.  Middle of the Road:  
The Restrictive Theory of Sovereign Immunity 
This status quo prevailed for most of the early twentieth century, but was 
increasingly criticized as foreign governments (and corporations owned or 
controlled by foreign governments) became more active in international 
commerce.76  It was argued that American business interests required 
greater protection when dealing with state owned corporations, which 
would otherwise be able to successfully claim immunity in U.S. courts 
during disputes.77  Moreover, many nations began to abandon the absolute 
theory of immunity in the early twentieth century, leading to an 
 
 68. Id. at 125; see also H.R. REP. NO. 94-1487, at 8 (1976), reprinted in 1976 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 6604, 6606. 
 69. Clinton L. Narver, Putting the “Sovereign” Back in the Foreign Sovereign 
Immunities Act:  The Case for a Time of Filing Test for Agency or Instrumentality Status, 19 
B.U. INT’L L.J. 163, 167–68 (2001). 
 70. 271 U.S. 562 (1926). 
 71. Verlinden B.V. v. Cent. Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 486 (1983). 
 72. Samantar v. Yousuf, 130 S. Ct. 2778, 2284 (2010). 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id.; see also Ex Parte Republic of Peru, 318 U.S. 578, 586–87 (1943) (noting that 
the policy was to generally defer to the executive branch in determining whether to invoke 
jurisdiction).  If the State Department declined to provide guidance, however, the court could 
decide for itself whether to recognize a claim of immunity. Id. at 587.  Specifically, the court 
would analyze whether the ground or grounds of the immunity claim were generally 
recognized by the State Department. See Republic of Mexico v. Hoffman, 324 U.S. 30, 36 
(1945). 
 75. See Republic of Austria v. Altmann, 541 U.S. 677, 677 (2004). 
 76. Narver, supra note 69, at 168; see also H.R. REP. NO. 94-1487, at 6 (1976), reprinted 
in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6604, 6605 (“American citizens are increasingly coming into contact 
with foreign states and entities owned by foreign states.”). 
 77. Vandenberg, supra note 59, at 744. 
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asymmetrical situation where the United States was subject to suit in the 
same nations to which it continually granted blanket immunity.78 
This state of affairs led the State Department to issue the so-called Tate 
Letter in 1952.79  This letter ushered in the restrictive theory of sovereign 
immunity, which provides immunity only for a sovereign’s public acts, as 
opposed to its private, commercial ones.80  While U.S. courts had 
previously touched upon this theory, it had never been formally adopted.81 
This new introduction, however, “threw immunity decisions into some 
disarray.”82  Specifically, certain foreign states began to utilize their 
diplomatic influence to pressure the State Department into making a formal 
suggestion of immunity to the court.83  This in turn led to a number of 
inconsistencies in the bestowal of immunity, as the merits of a case became 
secondary to political motivations.84  Moreover, when foreign states failed 
to formally request immunity via the State Department, the judiciary was 
still required to determine if immunity actually existed, leaving decisions on 
sovereign immunity split between the two government branches.85  This 
only exacerbated the inconsistencies in sovereign immunity cases, further 
illustrating the need for a formal mechanism to govern claims of 
immunity.86 
4.  The Modern Regime:  
The Federal Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 
In response to this muddled situation, Congress passed the FSIA in 
1976.87  Congress provided that the dual purposes of the statute were “(1) to 
endorse and codify the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity, and (2) to 
transfer primary responsibility for deciding ‘claims of foreign states to 
 
 78. Id.; see also H.R. REP. NO. 94-1487, at 7, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6604, 
6605 (“Moreover, [restrictive sovereign immunity] is regularly applied against the United 
States in suits against the U.S. Government in foreign courts.”). 
 79. Letter from Jack B. Tate, Acting Legal Adviser, U.S. Dep’t of State, to Acting Att’y 
Gen. Philip B. Perlman (May 19, 1952), reprinted in 26 DEP’T OF STATE BULL. 984–85 
(1952) [hereinafter Tate Letter]. 
 80. Verlinden B.V. v. Cent. Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 487 (1983); Tate Letter, 
supra note 79, at 984 (“[T]he immunity of the sovereign is recognized with regard to 
sovereign or public acts (jure imperii) of a state, but not with respect to private acts (jure 
gestionis).”). 
 81. See, e.g., The Pesaro, 277 F. 473 (S.D.N.Y. 1921). 
 82. Republic of Austria v. Altmann, 541 U.S. 677, 677 (2004). 
 83. See H.R. REP. NO. 94-1487, at 7, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6604, 6606 (“[A] 
foreign state may attempt to bring diplomatic influences to bear upon the State Department’s 
determination.”). 
 84. See Vandenberg, supra note 59, at 745 (“Thus, whether immunity was actually 
deserved became a secondary consideration in some instances.”). 
 85. Altmann, 541 U.S. at 677–78; see also Vandenberg, supra note 59, at 746 (noting the 
possibility of judicial contradictions in sovereign immunity cases). 
 86. Vandenberg, supra note 59, at 746 (“The two layers of potential inconsistency—
State Department politics and judicial contradictions—soon gave rise to the need for a 
method of stabilizing decision-making in determinations of foreign sovereign immunity.”). 
 87. Verlinden B.V. v. Cent. Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 488 (1983). 
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immunity’ from the State Department to the courts.”88  In doing so, 
legislators hoped that the statute would “create uniform and predictable 
standards for litigation involving foreign governments.”89  Additionally, the 
statute was intended to remain consonant with principles of international 
law90 and to “promote harmonious international relations.”91  The FSIA 
facilitated these objectives by formally establishing when and how parties 
could initiate and maintain suits against foreign states in U.S. courts and 
when a sovereign was entitled to immunity.92 
The statutory framework of the FSIA remains in force today and 
“provides the sole basis for obtaining jurisdiction over a foreign state in the 
courts of [the United States].”93  The first portion of the statute grants 
sovereigns a presumption of absolute immunity, mandating that foreign 
states—including their agents and instrumentalities—shall be immune from 
the jurisdiction of U.S. courts.94  However, the second portion of the statute 
carves out three major exceptions to this general rule, in keeping with a 
restrictive theory of foreign sovereign immunity.95  They are termed the 
waiver, commercial activity, and noncommercial tort exceptions.96  When 
 
 88. Samantar v. Yousuf, 130 S. Ct. 2278, 2285 (2010); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1602 (2012) 
(“The Congress finds that the determination by United States courts of the claims of foreign 
states to immunity from the jurisdiction of such courts would serve the interests of justice 
and would protect the rights of both foreign states and litigants in United States courts.”). 
 89. Aquamar S.A. v. Del Monte Fresh Produce N.A., 179 F.3d 1279, 1297–98 (11th Cir. 
1999); see also Verlinden, 461 U.S. at 488 (“Congress passed the [FSIA] in order to free the 
Government from the case-by-case diplomatic pressures, to clarify the governing standards, 
and to assure litigants that decisions are made on purely legal grounds and under procedures 
that insure due process.” (internal quotations omitted)). 
 90. Aquamar, 179 F.3d at 1294–95; see also H.R. REP. NO. 94-1487, at 9 (1976), 
reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6604, 6608 (noting that passage of the FSIA would bring 
the United States into conformity with the majority of states by transferring decisions 
regarding immunity to its judicial system). 
 91. Pere v. Nuovo Pignone, Inc., 150 F.3d 477, 480 (5th Cir. 1998) (citing Pullman 
Constr. Indus. v. United States, 23 F.3d 1166, 1169 (7th Cir. 1994)). 
 92. See First Nat’l City Bank v. Banco Para el Comercio Exterior de Cuba, 462 U.S. 
611, 620 (1983) (“[T]he Act was not intended to affect the substantive law determining the 
liability of a foreign state or instrumentality.”); see also H.R. REP. NO. 94-1487, at 6, 
reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6604, 6605 (“The purpose of the proposed legislation . . . is 
to provide when and how parties can maintain a lawsuit against a foreign state or its entities 
in the courts of the United States and to provide when a foreign state is entitled to sovereign 
immunity.”). 
 93. Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428, 433 (1989); see 
also Samantar, 130 S. Ct. at 2279 (noting that the preexisting common law was entirely 
displaced by the passage of the statute). 
 94. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1603–1604 (2012) (“Subject to existing international agreements . . . a 
foreign state shall be immune from the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States and of 
the States.”). 
 95. Verlinden B.V. v. Cent. Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 488–89 (1983); see also 
Narver, supra note 69, at 169–70. 
 96. Narver, supra note 69, at 170 (“The three most significant exceptions to the [FSIA]’s 
presumptive grant of immunity are waiver, commercial activity, and noncommercial tort.”).  
The waiver exception provides that a foreign state shall not be immune if it has waived its 
immunity, either explicitly or implicitly. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(1).  The commercial tort 
exception additionally provides that a foreign state shall not be immune where monetary 
damages are sought in connection with injury, death, or damage, or loss of property in the 
United States, as the result of tortious acts committed by the state or its actors. Id. 
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any one of these exceptions is triggered, the statute provides that the foreign 
state shall be subject to the jurisdiction of U.S. courts as if it were a private 
individual.97 
C.  The Commercial Activity Exception 
The most significant of the exceptions codified in the FSIA is the so-
called commercial activity exception.98  In its simplest terms, the exception 
works to “strip[] a sovereign of immunity when it engages in conduct 
commercial in nature”99 and, therefore, represents the statutory embodiment 
of the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity.100  More specifically, the 
provision stipulates that a foreign state surrenders its jurisdictional 
immunity where it:  (1) carries on a commercial activity in the United 
States; (2) performs an act in the United States related to its commercial 
activities elsewhere; or (3) performs an act outside of the United States 
related to its commercial activities elsewhere that causes a direct effect in 
the United States.101 
In defining “commercial activity,” the FSIA provides that the term may 
refer to either a particular commercial act or transaction, or “a regular 
course of commercial conduct.”102  Moreover, it mandates that, in 
determining whether an act is “commercial,” courts must look to the nature 
of the transaction or course of conduct rather than to its purpose.103 
As the Court has noted, “[t]his definition, however, leaves the critical 
term ‘commercial’ largely undefined.”104  Namely, it specifies (1) that 
commerciality does not depend on whether it is a single or regular 
occurrence, and (2) which element should be used to determine 
commerciality, while failing to explain what “commercial” actually 
 
§ 1605(a)(5).  This Note deals exclusively with the second exception, the commercial 
activity exception. See infra Part I.C. 
 97. See Weinstein v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 609 F.3d 43, 47 (2d Cir. 2010) (noting 
that an action against a foreign state “must fall within one of the FSIA’s exceptions to 
foreign sovereign immunity” in order for the court to exercise subject matter jurisdiction); 
Narver, supra note 69, at 170. 
 98. See generally Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, Inc., 504 U.S. 607, 611 (1992).  
Indeed, most cases involving plaintiffs’ claims that a foreign sovereign lacks immunity are 
premised on this exception. George K. Chamberlin, Exceptions to Jurisdictional Immunity of 
Foreign States and Their Property Under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 (28 
U.S.C.A. §§ 1602 et seq.), 59 A.L.R. Fed. 99 (1986). 
 99. 44B AM. JUR. 2D International Law § 139 (2015). 
 100. Narver, supra note 69, at 170. 
 101. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) (“A foreign state shall not be immune from the jurisdiction 
of the courts of the United States . . . in which the action is based upon a commercial activity 
carried on in the United States by the foreign state; or upon an act performed in the United 
States in connection with a commercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere; or upon an act 
outside the territory of the United States in connection with a commercial activity of the 
foreign state elsewhere and that act causes a direct effect in the United States . . . .”); see also 
Rogers v. Petroleo Brasileiro, S.A., 673 F.3d 131, 136 (2d Cir. 2012) (noting the commercial 
activity exception provides three separate bases for denying sovereign immunity). 
 102. 28 U.S.C. § 1603(d). 
 103. Id. 
 104. Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, Inc., 504 U.S. 607, 612 (1992). 
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means.105  Consequently, the Court has had to determine precisely what 
types of activity are “commercial” for the purposes of the statute.  In 
Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, Inc.,106 the Court began this analysis by 
holding that, because the FSIA codifies the restrictive theory of sovereign 
immunity, the statute’s meaning is what Congress understood the restrictive 
theory to require at the time it passed the statute.107  The Court noted that, 
per the Tate Letter, the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity was 
understood to grant immunity only to a state’s public actions, not its 
commercial activities.108  Therefore, it concluded that “when a foreign 
government acts, not as regulator of a market, but in the manner of a private 
player within [it, the foreign sovereign’s] actions are ‘commercial’ within 
the meaning of the FSIA.”109 
The Court has further emphasized that determining whether a state acts 
as a private party “is a question of behavior, not motivation.”110  In other 
words: 
[T]he question is not whether the foreign government is acting with a 
profit motive or . . . the aim of fulfilling uniquely sovereign objectives.  
Rather, the issue is whether the particular actions that the foreign state 
performs . . . are the type of actions by which a private party engages in 
“trade and traffic or commerce.”111 
Applying these principles to the case at bar, the Court went on to hold 
that the issuance of government bonds, even where such an issuance is 
designed to address an economic crisis, is a commercial activity for the 
purposes of the statutory exception.112  In contrast, in Saudi Arabia v. 
Nelson,113 the Court held that the plaintiff’s wrongful imprisonment could 
not trigger the exception, as, under the restrictive theory of sovereign 
immunity, the exercise of police power is a public, sovereign act.114 
D.  Tying It Together:  
Agency Principles and Foreign Sovereign Immunity 
Part I.D.1 of this Note begins by examining the general pattern followed 
in litigation involving agency principles and claims of foreign sovereign 
immunity.  A more specific subset of this litigation is then introduced in 
Part I.D.2, which gives context for understanding the relatively modern 
phenomenon of sovereign debt litigation.  Part I.D.3 then examines a 
subcategory of sovereign debt litigation, namely, holdout litigation 
 
 105. Id. 
 106. 504 U.S. 607 (1992). 
 107. See id. at 612–13; see also Saudi Arabia v. Nelson, 507 U.S. 349, 368–70 (1993) 
(White, J., concurring). 
 108. Weltover, 504 U.S. at 613–14 (citing Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of 
Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 698 (1976)). 
 109. Id. at 607. 
 110. Nelson, 507 U.S. at 360. 
 111. Weltover, 504 U.S. at 614 (citation omitted). 
 112. Id. at 615–17. 
 113. 507 U.S. 349 (1993). 
 114. Id. at 361. 
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conducted by so-called vulture funds.  Lastly, Part I.D.4 illustrates how 
agency principles may be applied within the sovereign debt litigation 
discussed in Parts I.D.2 and I.D.3 by closely examining a paradigmatic 
case. 
1.  Litigation Generally 
Pursuant to the commercial activity exception, a sovereign may be bound 
to commercial agreements via the traditional law of agency.115  In sovereign 
immunity claims involving agency principles, plaintiffs tend to allege an 
agency relationship between a sovereign and an actor in order to collect 
from the (theoretically) deep-pocketed sovereign.116  Because sovereign 
immunity is a question of subject matter jurisdiction,117 courts must address 
claims of immunity prior to making any determinations on the merits.118  
Therefore, the defendant must first satisfy the court that it is indeed a 
“foreign state” for the purposes of the FSIA; once it has done so, the burden 
shifts to the plaintiff to show that the claim “falls within the scope 
of . . . [the commercial activity] exception.”119 
While these cases encompass a range of various commercial activities,120 
a particularly relevant illustration is found in the field of sovereign debt 
litigation and, more specifically, holdout litigation conducted by investment 
funds focusing on sovereign debt. 
 
 115. See Sachs v. Republic of Austria, 737 F.3d 584, 592 (9th Cir. 2013) (“Under 
traditional agency principles, the foreign state may engage in commerce in the United 
States . . . indirectly by acting through its agents or subagents.”), cert. granted, 135 S. Ct. 
1172 (2015). 
 116. See, e.g., Seetransport Wiking Trader Schiffarhtsgesellschaft MBH & Co. v. 
Republic of Romania, 123 F. Supp. 2d 174 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (seeking to enforce a settlement 
agreement, stemming from the contractual breach of the Romanian state shipping company, 
which was signed by the Romanian Minister of Finance). 
 117. See Verlinden B.V. v. Cent. Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 493 (1983) (“[S]ubject-
matter jurisdiction in any such action depends on the existence of one of the specified 
exceptions to foreign sovereign immunity.” (citation omitted)); see also Nelson, 507 U.S. at 
355 (“[U]nless a specified exception applies, a federal court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction 
over a claim against a foreign state.”). 
 118. See Best Med. Belg., Inc. v. Belgium, 913 F. Supp. 2d 230, 236 (E.D. Va. 2012) 
(citing Velasco v. Gov’t of Indonesia, 370 F.3d 392, 398 (4th Cir. 2004)) (“A motion to 
dismiss on sovereign immunity grounds requires a court ‘to satisfy itself of its authority to 
hear a case’ through pretrial legal and factual determinations.”). 
 119. EduMoz, LLC v. Republic of Mozambique, 968 F. Supp. 2d 1041, 1061 (C.D. Cal. 
2013) (citing Peterson v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 627 F.3d 1117, 1125 (9th Cir. 2010)); see 
also 1964 Realty LLC v. Consulate of the State of Qatar-New York, No. 14 Civ. 6429, 2015 
WL 5197327, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 4, 2015) (noting that the plaintiff bears the burden of 
proof on the applicability of an exception, although the “the ultimate burden of persuasion of 
demonstrating that an FSIA exception does not apply lies with Defendant”). 
 120. See, e.g., Allfreight Worldwide Cargo, Inc. v. Ethiopian Airlines Enter., 307 F. 
App’x 721 (4th Cir. 2009) (analyzing a breach of contract); Republic of Benin v. Mezei, No. 
06 Civ. 870 (JGK), 2010 WL 3564270 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 9, 2010) (concerning a real estate 
conveyance); Amorrortu v. Republic of Peru, 570 F. Supp. 2d 916 (S.D. Tex. 2008) 
(concerning government confiscation of oil interests). 
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2.  Sovereign Debt Litigation 
Sovereign debt litigation is a relatively recent phenomenon, considering 
that sovereigns were almost entirely immune from suit until the middle of 
the twentieth century.121  Following the codification of the restrictive theory 
of sovereign immunity via the FSIA, sovereigns were, at least theoretically, 
open to suit for certain commercial activities.122  In 1992, the Court 
clarified in Weltover that, for the purposes of the FSIA, a sovereign’s 
issuance of public debt is a commercial activity.123  Almost simultaneously, 
sovereign debtors began waiving their sovereign immunity, explicitly 
consenting to U.S. courts’ jurisdiction when entering into commercial 
transactions.124  The predictable result of this combination was that 
creditors increasingly began to utilize litigation in an effort to enforce 
claims against sovereign debtors.125  Litigation only became more alluring 
for sovereign creditors after a series of favorable decisions in U.S. domestic 
courts in the wake of the Latin American debt crisis.126 
3.  Holdout Litigation and Investment Funds 
This combination of factors has led to the increased popularity of holdout 
litigation, often conducted by distressed-debt investors, which are more 
commonly, and less flatteringly, termed “vulture funds.”127  These funds, 
usually hedge funds or mutual funds, are commonly based in tax havens 
and tend be secretive in nature.128  They profit by purchasing the bonds of 
financially distressed countries on the secondary debt market, often at 
substantial discounts from their face value because the sovereign is at or 
near default.129  The investors then file suit, typically in creditor-friendly 
jurisdictions, to enforce the full value of the debt,130 often urging courts to 
take an expansive view of exceptions to sovereign immunity.131  Because 
they are entitled to the full amount of the claim, which amounts to principal 
plus any unpaid interest, vulture funds have a strong incentive to hold out 
 
 121. See supra Part I.B.1. 
 122. See supra Part I.B.4. 
 123. Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, Inc., 504 U.S. 607, 611 (1992). 
 124. Jill E. Fisch & Caroline M. Gentile, Vultures or Vanguards?:  The Role of Litigation 
in Sovereign Debt Restructuring, 53 EMORY L.J. 1043, 1076 (2004). 
 125. Id. 
 126. See Broomfield, supra note 20, at 481–83.  Specifically, the relevant cases include 
Libra Bank Ltd. v. Banco Nacional de Costa Rica, 570 F. Supp. 870 (S.D.N.Y. 1983), and 
Allied Bank v. Banco Credito Agricola de Cartago, 566 F. Supp. 1440 (S.D.N.Y. 1983), 
which is often referred to as the first case of holdout litigation in the context of sovereign 
debt. Broomfield, supra note 20, at 481–83. 
 127. See Broomfield, supra 20, at 485–86. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id.; Jonathan I. Blackman & Rahul Mukhi, The Evolution of Modern Sovereign Debt 
Litigation:  Vultures, Alter Egos and Other Legal Fauna, 73 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 47, 49 
(2010).  The term “vulture fund” is derived from this practice, as the funds are seen as taking 
advantage of debtor nations when they are at their most vulnerable. Id. 
 130. Broomfield, supra note 20, at 486. 
 131. See Blackman, supra note 129, at 50. 
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for full payment.132  Indeed, they are not subject to the same pressures as 
repeat investors, meaning that they are often successful in obtaining 
substantial payments via such holdout litigation to the detriment of other 
investors and the sovereign debtor itself.133 
4.  Agency Application:  
The Democratic Republic of the Congo 
A paradigmatic example of sovereign debt litigation implicating agency 
principles can be found in Themis Capital, LLC v. Democratic Republic of 
Congo,134 one of a multitude of cases involving the troubled state of the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo.  The litigation can be traced as far back 
as 1980, when the Republic of Zaire and its national bank entered into a 
credit refinancing agreement with some of its plethora of creditors.135  In 
the years following the signing of this agreement, Zaire was “plagued with 
political and social instability,”136 and the country eventually defaulted on 
the credit obligations in 1990.137  In May 1997, following the ouster of the 
country’s infamous and longstanding dictator Joseph-Desire Mobutu in a 
coup, the self-declared President Laurent-Desire Kabila changed the name 
of the country to the Democratic Republic of the Congo138 (DRC).  The 
DRC later reaffirmed its obligations under the agreement in a series of 
acknowledgement letters, the most recent of which was signed in 2003 by 
the interim Minister of Finance, as well as the Governor of the Central 
Bank139 (“the 2003 letter”). 
The plaintiffs in the case, Themis Capital and Des Moines Investments, 
LLC, purchased the debt obligations specified in the agreement from 
various creditors.140  They then brought suit in the Southern District of New 
York, alleging that the DRC had breached its contractual obligations under 
the credit agreement by failing to pay any of the principal or interest 
 
 132. See Fisch & Gentile, supra note 124, at 1045 n.2. 
 133. Id. at 1090.  Specifically, this is because vulture funds are not repeat players in the 
international debt market and therefore have little incentive to take actions that are best for 
the international community, or with the long-term in mind. See James Thuo Gathii, The 
Sanctity of Sovereign Loan Contracts and Its Origins in Enforcement Litigation, 38 GEO. 
WASH. INT’L L. REV. 251, 267 (2006). 
 134. 881 F. Supp. 2d 508 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).  This case represents only the first decision in 
a series of litigation that will be discussed throughout this Note. See Themis Capital II, 35 F. 
Supp. 3d 457 (S.D.N.Y. 2014), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 2015 WL 5711815 (2d Cir. Sept. 
30, 2015). 
 135. Themis Capital I, 881 F. Supp. 2d at 511. 
 136. Id. at 513. 
 137. Themis Capital II, 35 F. Supp. 3d at 462. 
 138. Themis Capital I, 881 F. Supp. 2d at 513. 
 139. Id.  The court noted that the specific intent of these letters was to reassure creditors 
that the originally refinanced debts were still collectible and that they made specific 
reference to the inapplicability of New York’s statute of limitations provisions. Id. at 513–
14. 
 140. See id. at 512. 
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specified.141  The DRC claimed that neither the interim Minister of Finance 
nor the Governor of the Central Bank had the requisite authority to sign the 
2003 acknowledgement letter reaffirming the DRC’s debt obligations and 
that the plaintiffs’ claim was therefore time barred.142 
The court began its analysis by noting that, per New York law, “apparent 
authority can bind foreign governments whose acts are private, including 
enter [sic] into commercial transactions on apparent behalf of a sovereign 
state.”143  The court then determined that the act of restructuring debt is a 
quintessentially commercial, private one that may deprive a sovereign of 
immunity in the context of the FSIA.144  Consequently, the court launched 
into an analysis under the doctrine of apparent authority, looking to “(1) 
what the general responsibilities were of the persons holding those 
domestic-government positions at the time of the 2003 [l]etter, and (2) how 
these responsibilities were communicated to persons outside of the DRC, 
including counterparties in commerce transactions.”145  The court 
concluded that further discovery was necessary to make factual 
determinations on these issues, as well as on the question of whether the 
plaintiffs had breached their own duty to inquire whether the letter was 
valid.146 
Following discovery and a bench trial, the court determined that the two 
state officials had both actual and apparent authority to sign the 2003 
acknowledgement letter, and thus the DRC was bound to its debt 
obligations.147  In regard to their actual authority, the DRC argued that, per 
an official decree, only the entire Council of Ministers had the authority to 
renew debt obligations.148  The court, however, interpreted this decree to 
require such approval only where decisions would have “budgetary 
repercussions.”149  It then went on to hold that the 2003 acknowledgement 
letter did not involve any such repercussions, as it merely constituted a 
routine tolling agreement, and that, consequently, the two lone officials had 
actual authority to sign the letter.150 
 
 141. Id. at 514.  The court noted that the original creditors had not brought any claims 
themselves alleging a breach of the agreement prior to transferring their rights to the 
plaintiffs. Id. at 513. 
 142. Id. at 518.  The DRC had originally made a blanket claim of sovereign immunity, 
but the court determined that a waiver clause in the original credit agreement was 
enforceable and stripped the DRC of a presumption of immunity. See id. at 516–17. 
 143. Id. at 526; Themis Capital II, 35 F. Supp. 3d 457, 471 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (noting that 
the court in Themis Capital, LLC v. Democratic Republic of Congo (Themis Capital I) 
rejected the DRC’s arguments of sovereign immunity, because the DRC could be bound, in 
principle, under the doctrine of actual and apparent authority), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 
2015 WL 5711815 (2d Cir. Sept. 30, 2015). 
 144. See Themis Capital I, 881 F. Supp. 2d at 526 (citing Saudi Arabia v. Nelson, 507 
U.S. 349, 360 (1992)). 
 145. Id. at 527. 
 146. Id. at 531–32. 
 147. Themis Capital II, 35 F. Supp. 3d at 494. 
 148. Id. at 476. 
 149. Id. 
 150. Id. at 477–78. 
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The court also determined that the DRC was bound by virtue of its 
agents’ apparent authority.151  Specifically, the court found that it was 
“eminently reasonable” for creditors to believe that the acting Minister of 
Finance and Governor of the Central Bank possessed sufficient authority to 
sign the letter.152  First, it found that the belief was justified based on the 
two officials’ status as national-level officers, charged with maintaining the 
DRC’s monetary policy and fiscal stability.153  Second, the court noted that 
previous Finance Ministers and Governors of the Central Bank had signed 
two earlier acknowledgement letters without objection.154  It therefore 
found that it would be reasonable for creditors to assume that “these same 
two officials had the authority to sign a substantively identical letter in 
2003.”155  The court additionally determined that creditors’ duty of inquiry 
was not triggered, because the transaction was not extraordinary and there 
were no factual circumstances that should have put creditors on notice of a 
danger of fraud.156 
Having determined that the agents’ signing of the 2003 
acknowledgement letter bound the DRC, the court held that the plaintiffs’ 
claim was not barred by the New York statute of limitations provision and 
entered judgment in their favor.157  The court awarded Themis damages of 
$38,711,890.27 and Des Moines $30,826,825.24.158 
II.  LET’S GET READY TO RUMBLE:  
DIVERGENT APPLICATIONS OF APPARENT AUTHORITY 
IN THE LOWER COURTS 
This part investigates the conflicting views of the federal circuits in 
applying the legal principles and theories discussed in Part I.  Specifically, 
Part II.A examines the minority rule, as crafted by the Second Circuit in 
First Fidelity.  Part II.B looks to the rule adopted by the majority of circuit 
courts by walking through decisions of the Ninth, Fourth, and Fifth 
Circuits. 
 
 151. Id. at 479–80. 
 152. Id. 
 153. Id. 
 154. Id. at 480. 
 155. Id. 
 156. Id. at 481.  The court’s conclusions on authority seem to have been much influenced 
by the fact that the two older acknowledgement letters, from 1991 and 1997 respectively, 
had not been discovered at the time of the first decision. Id. at 472.  Indeed, in that case, the 
court noted the somewhat suspicious signing of the 2003 letter, which, on “behalf of a cash-
poor country, renewed a financial obligation, now totaling approximately $80 million, 
against which claims were long barred by the statute of limitations, and evidently for no 
consideration whatsoever.” Themis Capital I, 881 F. Supp. 2d 508, 529 (S.D.N.Y. 2012). 
 157. Themis Capital II, 35 F. Supp. 3d at 494. 
 158. Id.  The Second Circuit recently affirmed almost the entirety of the Court’s holding, 
reversing only a portion of the decision related to the calculation of damages. Themis 
Capital, LLC v. Democratic Republic of Congo, Nos. 14-4016-cv(L), 14-4168-cv(XAP), 
2015 WL 5711815, at *3 (2d Cir. Sept. 30, 2015). 
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A.  The Minority Position 
Part II.A.1 examines, at greater length, the Second Circuit’s elucidation 
of the minority rule in its decision in First Fidelity.  Part II.A.2 surveys the 
dissenting opinion in First Fidelity, as well as subsequent disagreements 
with, or reinterpretations of, this minority rule. 
1.  The Second Circuit 
Most simply put, the minority position holds that the doctrine of apparent 
authority applies to sovereigns and their agents in the context of foreign 
sovereign immunity claims.159  As previously noted, the Second Circuit 
first elucidated this rule in its landmark decision, First Fidelity.160  The 
plaintiff in the case, First Fidelity, contended that the Antiguan Ambassador 
to the UN, Loydstone Jacobs, had actual authority to bind Antigua to a loan 
agreement and waive its sovereign immunity in a settlement agreement.161  
First Fidelity argued in the alternative that even if Jacobs lacked actual 
authority, he had sufficient apparent authority to bind Antigua.162  
Specifically, First Fidelity emphasized that the authority inherent in 
Jacobs’s position as Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary was, 
standing alone, sufficient to render his actions binding.163  In response, the 
Antiguan Government contended that, under Antiguan law, “the authority 
to borrow funds requires the prior approval of the cabinet and a delegation 
of authority to the Minister of Finance[] and that neither had occurred in 
this case.”164  Therefore, because Jacobs acted without authority, Antigua 
asserted that it had retained its sovereign immunity under the FSIA.165 
The court began its analysis of these claims by reviewing principles of 
international law, citing to the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations for 
the basic proposition that an Ambassador’s powers include the authority to 
sign international agreements.166  As such, it noted that an Ambassador has 
the authority to bind the state he represents and that, under certain 
circumstances, “a state can be bound by [a] representative’s unauthorized 
actions where the lack of authority is not obvious.”167 
 
 159. See generally First Fidelity Bank v. Gov’t of Antigua & Barbuda, 877 F.2d 189 (2d 
Cir. 1989); see also 1964 Realty LLC v. Consulate of the State of Qatar-New York, No. 14 
Civ. 6429, 2015 WL 5197327, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 4, 2015) (“However, regardless of how 
other courts have ruled, this Court is bound by the Second Circuit’s case law and is thus 
required to apply the doctrine of apparent authority as the Circuit has instructed.”). But cf. 
Republic of Benin v. Mezei, 06 Civ. 870, 2010 WL 3564270, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 9, 2010) 
(“[A]pparent authority is insufficient in dealing with the federal or state governments.”). 
 160. For a more detailed discussion of the factual circumstances of the case, see supra 
INTRODUCTION. 
 161. First Fidelity, 877 F.2d at 191–92. 
 162. Id. 
 163. Id. at 192. 
 164. Id. at 197 (Newman, J., dissenting). 
 165. Id. at 191 (majority opinion). 
 166. Id. at 192 (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 311 (AM. LAW 
INST. 1987)). 
 167. Id.  The court pointed to the example of Legal Status of Eastern Greenland (Den. v. 
Nor.), 1933 P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B) No. 53 (Apr. 5), where the Permanent Court of International 
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However, the court went on to reject First Fidelity’s implied argument 
that Antigua was bound by Jacobs’s actions solely by virtue of his 
position.168  The court based this conclusion on principles governing the 
validity of international agreements.169  The court reasoned that if the 
circumstances surrounding an Ambassador’s signing of an international 
agreement could render it void, then the mere act of signing such an 
agreement could not automatically bind a sovereign either.170 
The court also looked to section 207 of the Restatement (Third) of 
Foreign Relations, which provides that a state is liable for an agent’s 
violation of international legal obligations when the agent is acting in the 
scope, or under color, of authority.171  While facially this would seem to 
bolster First Fidelity’s position, the court concluded that the provision 
applied only to violations of international law and not to commercial 
agreements.172  Therefore, the court held that “an ambassador’s actions 
under color of authority do not, as a matter of law, automatically bind the 
state.”173 
The court did, however, note that section 207 included elements of 
agency law in requiring consideration of all the circumstances in assessing 
the scope of authority.174  This was particularly relevant to the facts of the 
case at bar, because it required investigation of “whether the affected parties 
reasonably considered the action to be official[] [and] whether the action 
was for public purpose or for private gain.”175  Therefore, the court 
concluded that the law of agency provided the appropriate analytical 
framework176—the proper question was whether Jacobs, by virtue of his 
ambassadorial position, had the apparent authority to borrow funds and/or 
waive sovereign immunity via a settlement agreement.177 
The court began its discussion of this question by citing to the general 
principles of the Restatement (Second) of Agency, noting that “[t]he 
 
Justice held that Norway was bound by the Norwegian Foreign Minister’s oral statement that 
the country would not contest Danish control of Eastern Greenland. Id. 
 168. See id. (“[T]he possession of authority does not, ipso facto, validate every exercise 
of it.”). 
 169. Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 331(2)(a) (AM. LAW 
INST. 1987)). 
 170. See id. at 192–93 (“If the circumstances surrounding an ambassador’s signature of a 
treaty may be grounds for invalidating that treaty, then surely a state cannot automatically be 
bound by its ambassador’s settlement of a lawsuit by a non-sovereign third party arising 
from a commercial transaction.”). 
 171. Id. at 193 (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 207(c) (AM. 
LAW INST. 1987)). 
 172. Id.  The court noted that a breach of a commercial agreement could violate this 
section if it was discriminatory, or it if occurred for official reasons, but neither was at issue 
in the case. Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 712(2) cmt. h, 
Reporters’ n.8 (AM. LAW INST. 1987)). 
 173. Id. 
 174. Id. 
 175. Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 207 cmt. d (AM. LAW 
INST. 1987)). 
 176. Id. 
 177. Id. 
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appointment of a person to a position with generally recognized duties may 
create apparent authority.”178  It found that the use of these agency 
principles would ensure a requisite level of flexibility in its analysis.179  
Specifically, it noted that these principles would give “appropriate weight” 
to the authority of the relevant ambassadorship.180  It reasoned that agency 
law would allow for consideration of Jacobs’s position, a factual 
circumstance relevant in determining the reasonability of First Fidelity’s 
reliance, but would not make his ambassadorship inevitably 
determinative.181 
The court, however, declined to make a determination on the merits, 
holding that it would be impossible to make a decision where the facts were 
“susceptible of two opposing interpretations.”182  Namely, it concluded that 
First Fidelity had sufficiently alleged that Jacobs had possessed apparent 
authority and, therefore, that Antigua was bound by his actions.183  
However, the court also determined that there was some evidence that First 
Fidelity had mistrusted Jacobs, which would impact the reasonability of its 
reliance.184  The court thus vacated the default judgment, remanded the case 
to district court, and required that Antigua post a bond in the amount 
claimed by First Fidelity.185 
2.  The Second Circuit:  
Dissents and Attempts at Reconciliation 
In his dissenting opinion in First Fidelity, Judge Newman rejected the 
majority’s decision on the grounds that it would severely impair U.S. 
foreign relations.186  While he agreed that an Ambassador would not be 
able to bind his or her government in every case, he noted that this finding 
alone “does not inevitably lead to a conclusion that only apparent authority 
furnishes the appropriate standard.”187  Rather, he advocated for the 
application of the doctrine of inherent agency power as elucidated in the 
Restatement (Second) of Agency.188  He justified this choice by asking 
 
 178. Id. at 193; see Jota v. Texaco, 157 F.3d 153, 162 (2d Cir. 1998) (holding that an 
Ambassador generally has the power to bind the state he represents); see also Themis Capital 
I, 881 F. Supp. 2d 508, 527 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (“[O]fficials have apparent authority to bind 
foreign sovereigns when the obligation to which by the official committed is of the sort of 
commitment that such an official ordinarily has the authority to make.”). 
 179. First Fidelity, 877 F.2d at 194. 
 180. Id. 
 181. Id. 
 182. Id. at 195. 
 183. Id. 
 184. Id.  Under New York law, a party claiming the existence of apparent authority must 
show that he or she fulfilled the “duty of inquiry” or, in other words, that they had no notice 
of the need to inquire further into the agent’s authority. See Gen. Overseas Films v. Robin 
Int’l, Inc., 542 F. Supp. 684, 689 (S.D.N.Y. 1982). 
 185. First Fidelity, 877 F.2d at 196. 
 186. Id. at 196–97 (Newman, J., dissenting). 
 187. Id. at 198. 
 188. Id.  For a discussion of general principles of inherent agency power, see supra Part 
I.A.3. 
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whether U.S. government relations would be better served by allowing 
Ambassadors to promptly obtain goods or services, or by requiring third 
parties to verify, in each instance, whether the Ambassador had the actual 
authority to do so.189  Strongly advocating for the former, Judge Newman 
highlighted that the majority’s rule could have a chilling effect, in that 
vendors would be less willing to extend services or credit to embassies 
under the shadow of litigation.190  Therefore, Judge Newman concluded 
that Antigua should have been bound by Jacobs’s actions.191 
In the same vein, other courts within the Second Circuit have questioned 
the rule elucidated in First Fidelity.  In Republic of Benin v. Mezei,192 Judge 
John G. Koeltl referred to the holding in First Fidelity as a mere suggestion 
that apparent authority could bind a foreign sovereign to a commercial 
transaction.193  Therefore, he concluded that “[i]n general, apparent 
authority is insufficient in dealing with the federal or state governments.  A 
person who contracts with a government agent . . . does so at the 
individual’s peril if the agent is unauthorized.”194 
Meanwhile, in Themis Capital, Judge Paul A. Engelmayer concluded that 
“[a]lthough this Court is under no illusion that it can fully harmonize the 
decisions in this area,” the circuit decisions were actually consistent with 
one another.195  Specifically, the court found that the cases actually turned 
on whether the specific legal commitment made by [an agent on] behalf 
of the foreign government was (1) a public act, in which case apparent 
authority has generally been held unavailable, except in the discrete 
context presented by waivers of sovereign immunity by ambassadors; or 
(2) a private act, in which case apparent authority has generally been held 
available.196 
In other words, Judge Engelmeyer has concluded that the circuit split is 
not a split at all.  Rather, the application of apparent authority depends on 
whether the agent’s act is “public” or “private.”197  The court defined 
private acts as those in which “a private party engages in trade and traffic or 
 
 189. First Fidelity, 877 F.2d at 198–99 (Newman, J., dissenting). 
 190. Id. at 199. 
 191. Id. at 200. 
 192. No. 06 Civ. 870, 2010 WL 3564270 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 9, 2010). 
 193. Id. at *6. 
 194. Id.  However, the court did go on to analyze the facts of the case applying the 
doctrine of apparent authority, concluding that “even if a foreign government can be bound 
by its agent acting with apparent authority, the defendants could not reasonably rely on [the 
agent’s] purported authority.” Id. at *7. 
 195. Themis Capital I, 881 F. Supp. 2d 508, 523 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (emphasis added). 
 196. Id.; accord Republic of Iraq v. ABB AG, 920 F. Supp. 2d 517, 538 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) 
(“[C]ourts have interpreted that rule to permit apparent authority to bind a sovereign engaged 
in private conduct but to demand actual authority to bind a sovereign engaged in public 
conduct.”). 
 197. Themis Capital I, 881 F. Supp. at 524.  Other courts within the Second Circuit have, 
however, declined to follow this analysis. See, e.g., 1964 Realty LLC v. Consulate of the 
State of Qatar-New York, No. 14 Civ. 6429, 2015 WL 5197327, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 4, 
2015) (“While this Court finds Themis to be persuasive, it notes that in First Fidelity the 
Second Circuit made no distinction between ‘public’ or ‘private’ acts . . . [a]ccordingly, the 
Court declines to follow Themis.”). 
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commerce.”198  Public acts, meanwhile, are those acts available to 
sovereigns alone, such as a waiver of sovereign immunity.199  However, the 
line between these two types of acts can be blurred.  Specifically, an act 
may be superficially private, because it deals with a commercial activity, 
when it is actually public, because the underlying action is a waiver of 
sovereign immunity.200 
Having defined these categories of acts, Judge Engelmayer characterized 
the Ninth, Fourth, and Fifth Circuits’ cases as dealing with public acts, 
which explained why apparent authority was rejected.201  He argued that 
while the acts in these cases seemed to be commercial in nature on their 
faces, they actually concerned a waiver of sovereign immunity.202  Judge 
Engelmayer then turned to Second Circuit decisions applying apparent 
authority, concluding that they all dealt with either private acts of 
government agents or ambassadorial waivers of sovereign immunity.203  
Thus, Judge Engelmayer concluded that, in the instant case, which dealt 
with the signing of an acknowledgement letter renewing certain state debt 
obligations, the doctrine of apparent authority would apply because it 
centered on the private, commercial act of restructuring sovereign debt.204 
B.  The Majority Position 
Part II.B.1 examines the Ninth Circuit’s response to First Fidelity, in 
which the majority rule denying the applicability of the doctrine of apparent 
authority was first announced.  Part II.B.2 then analyzes the Fourth 
Circuit’s decision to adopt this majority rule, and Part II.B.3 does the same 
as to the Fifth Circuit’s adoption. 
1.  The Ninth Circuit 
In the aftermath of First Fidelity, the Ninth Circuit addressed the issue of 
apparent authority in the context of foreign sovereign immunity claims in 
Phaneuf v. Republic of Indonesia.205  The plaintiff in the case, Curtis 
Phaneuf, held certain promissory notes issued by members of the National 
Defense Security Council of Indonesia206 (NDSC).  These notes were part 
of a greater issuance that was collectively valued at three billion dollars.207  
The notes bore the crest of the NDSC and signatures of two NDSC 
 
 198. Themis Capital I, 881 F. Supp. 2d at 524 (quoting NML Capital v. Republic of 
Argentina, 680 F.3d 254, 258 (2d Cir. 2012)). 
 199. Id. 
 200. Id. 
 201. Id. at 524–25 (collecting cases from the Ninth, Fourth, and Fifth Circuits). 
 202. Id. 
 203. Id. at 525. 
 204. Id. at 526. 
 205. 106 F.3d 302 (9th Cir. 1997). 
 206. Id. at 304.  The NDSC was an advisory body formed by a decree of the Indonesian 
President. Velasco v. Gov’t of Indonesia, 370 F.3d 392, 401 (4th Cir. 2004).  The NDSC was 
tasked with, among other things, conducting studies on national security. Id. 
 207. Phaneuf, 106 F.3d at 304. 
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members.208  The primary creator of these notes, Ibnu Hartomo, later traded 
them for promissory notes issued by a Syrian financier.209  At a subsequent 
signing ceremony in Damascus, the Indonesian Ambassador to Syria, H.A. 
Chalid Mawardi, certified that Hartomo represented the Indonesian 
government and that the notes were “Official/Governmental.”210  The 
Syrian notes later proved to be worthless.211 
The Indonesian Government claimed that it had no knowledge of the 
notes until 1985, when it declared them invalid.212  In 1986, the Secretary 
General of the NDSC alerted Bank Indonesia as to the invalidity of the 
notes.213  The NDSC then issued a press release disavowing the notes and 
stating that responsibility lay with their individual creators.214 
After Bank Indonesia refused to honor Phaneuf’s notes, he sued the 
Republic of Indonesia, the NDSC, and Mawardi in U.S. district court.215  
The district court denied the defendants’ motion to dismiss on the grounds 
of sovereign immunity, holding that they had failed to establish a prima 
facie case for immunity under the FSIA.216  The court relied on a footnote 
in Siderman de Blake v. Republic of Argentina,217 which required that, in 
order to establish a presumption of immunity, a sovereign defendant must 
establish that it is a sovereign state and that the plaintiff’s claim arises out 
of a public act.218 
The Ninth Circuit reversed this decision, holding that a sovereign 
defendant need only prove they are a foreign state to be entitled to a 
presumption of immunity under the FSIA.219  The court then launched into 
a burden-shifting analysis,220 holding Phanuef met the initial burden of 
pleading that the commercial activity exception applied to the case.221  
 
 208. Id. 
 209. Id.  Hartomo and Soebagyo Soedewo, the other primary creator of the notes, were 
NDSC Deputies for Development and Long-Term Planning. Velasco, 370 F.3d at 395.  
Hartomo later admitted that he knew he was unauthorized to issue the notes and that the 
former Secretary General of the NDSC had declared his two purported letters of 
authorization to be forgeries. Id. at 395–96. 
 210. Phanuef, 106 F.3d at 304.  The President of the Central Bank of Syria attended the 
signing ceremony, and an official of the Syrian Ministry of Foreign Affairs also notarized 
Mawardi’s signature on the notes. Velasco, 370 F.3d at 395. 
 211. Phanuef, 106 F. at 304. 
 212. Id. 
 213. Id.  He stated that the NDSC and its members lacked the authority to issue any such 
promissory notes. Id. 
 214. Id.  The international press widely reported on the forged notes and the consequent 
Indonesian repudiation. Velasco, 370 F.3d at 396–97. 
 215. Phanuef, 106 F.3d at 304. 
 216. Id. at 305. 
 217. 965 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1992). 
 218. Id. at 708 n.9. 
 219. Phanuef, 106 F.3d at 305.  The court also separately considered Mawardi’s 
entitlement to immunity per the standard applied to individual foreign officials under the 
FSIA. Id. at 306–07. 
 220. See supra Part I.D.1 for a general discussion of this burden-shifting framework. 
 221. Phanuef, 106 F.3d at 307.  Specifically, the court concluded that Phanuef had 
submitted sufficient evidence that the members of the NDSC had actual or apparent 
authority to issue the notes. Id. 
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Therefore, the burden shifted to the defendants to rebut this showing.222  
The defendants argued that the exception could not apply because “there 
was no ‘commercial activity of the foreign state.’”223  Specifically, the 
defendants contended that they could not be bound by the NDSC members’ 
or Mawardi’s actions because those individuals acted outside the scope of 
their authority in issuing the notes.224  The question therefore was narrowed 
to “whether an agent of a foreign state must have acted with actual 
authority to invoke the commercial activity exception against a foreign 
state, or whether apparent authority suffices.”225 
The court interpreted the FSIA to conclude that only “actual authority 
can be used to invoke the [commercial activity] exception.”226  Specifically, 
the court first noted that all three clauses of the exception require “a 
commercial activity of the foreign state.”227  The plain meaning of this 
provision, then, is that the state itself must be engaged in the commercial 
activity for the exception to apply.228 
The court then looked at the commercial activity exception through the 
lens of agency law, reasoning that “[b]ecause a foreign state acts through its 
agents, an agent’s deed which is based on the actual authority of the foreign 
state constitutes activity ‘of the foreign state.’”229  Thus, where an agent 
acts beyond the scope of his authority, the agent is not engaging in any 
business the sovereign has authorized him to do.230  Therefore, the court 
concluded, “If the foreign state has not empowered its agent to act, the 
agent’s unauthorized act cannot be attributed to the foreign state[, because] 
there is no ‘activity of the foreign state.’”231 
The court bolstered this conclusion by turning to a number of 
supplementary considerations.  First, it referenced the rules of statutory 
construction, including the rule of ordinary meaning and the rule against 
implying exceptions.232  It also invoked the canon of expressio unius est 
exclusio alterius, reasoning that if Congress had intended the exception to 
 
 222. Id. 
 223. Id. (emphasis in original) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) (2012)). 
 224. Id. 
 225. Id. 
 226. Id. 
 227. Id. (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2)).  The statutory language of the commercial 
activity exception states, 
A foreign state shall not be immune from the jurisdiction of courts of the United 
States . . . in which the action is based upon a commercial activity carried on in the 
United States by the foreign state; or upon an act performed in the United States in 
connection with a commercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere; or upon an 
act outside the territory of the United States in connection with a commercial 
activity of the foreign state elsewhere and that act causes a direct effect in the 
United States. 
28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2). 
 228. Phanuef, 106 F.3d at 307. 
 229. Id. at 307–08. 
 230. Id. at 308. 
 231. Id. 
 232. See id. (citing Export Grp. v. Reef Indus., 54 F.3d 1466, 1473 (9th Cir. 1995)). 
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encompass acts committed without actual authority, it could have said so 
explicitly.233 
The court also reinforced its “conclusion that evidence of apparent 
authority should not be sufficient to invoke the FSIA’s commercial activity 
exception” with precedent.234  For example, in Chuidian v. Philippine 
National Bank,235 the Ninth Circuit ruled that an agent acting outside the 
scope of his authority was not entitled to individual immunity under the 
FSIA236 and that the natural corollary of this must be that a state retains its 
immunity when an agent so acts.237  Additionally, in In re Estate of 
Ferdinand E. Marcos Human Rights Litigation,238 the Ninth Circuit held 
that the defendant’s acts were not entitled to immunity because they were 
taken without official sanction.239  The court analogized that unofficial acts, 
likewise, could not be considered “acts of a foreign state,” as required by 
the plain language of the statute.240 
Finally the court examined U.S. domestic immunity principles.241  The 
court noted that when an actor deals with a putative agent of the United 
States, it bears the risk that the agent is acting outside the scope of 
authority, even if the actor reasonably believes the agent has sufficient 
authority.242  Moreover, it observed that the United States can be estopped 
from claiming immunity only where its agent acted within the scope of his 
or her authority.243  The court concluded that these principles further 
supported its conclusion that apparent authority is insufficient to invoke the 
commercial activity exception.244 
Thus, the court remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with 
its ruling.245  On remand, the district court granted the defendant’s motion 
to dismiss, finding that the issuers of the promissory notes lacked actual 
authority, and, on appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed.246 
 
 233. See id. 
 234. Id. 
 235. 912 F.2d 1095 (9th Cir. 1990). 
 236. See id. at 1106. 
 237. Phaneuf, 106 F.3d at 308. 
 238. 978 F.2d 493 (9th Cir. 1992). 
 239. Id. at 498.  The defendants in the case included the notorious ex-Philippine dictator 
President Ferdinand Marcos and his daughter Imee Marcos-Manotoc. Id. at 495.  The latter 
claimed she was entitled to sovereign immunity under the FSIA, which divested federal 
courts of jurisdiction over actions taken by a foreign government against its citizens (namely, 
torture and execution). Id. 
 240. Phaneuf, 106 F.3d at 308. 
 241. Id. 
 242. Id. (citing Fed. Crop Ins. Co. v. Merrill, 332 U.S. 380, 384 (1947); Bollow v. Fed. 
Reserve Bank, 640 F.2d 1093, 1100 (9th Cir. 1981)). 
 243. Id. (citing Saulque v. United States, 663 F.2d 968, 976 (9th Cir. 1981)). 
 244. Id. 
 245. Id. at 309. 
 246. See Phanuef v. Gov’t of Indonesia, 18 F. App’x 648 (9th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 
535 U.S. 987 (2002). 
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2.  The Fourth Circuit 
In Velasco v. Government of Indonesia,247 the Fourth Circuit expressly 
adopted the Ninth Circuit’s holding.248  The case concerned more of the 
same promissory notes dealt with in Phanuef.249  The plaintiff, George 
Velasco, purchased the notes in Panama from an Italian businessman for 
consideration equivalent to $2.1 million.250  He sued the Indonesian 
government, the NDSC, Mawardi, and Hartomo in district court after the 
Bank of Indonesia refused to honor payment of the notes.251  The district 
court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss, holding that the plaintiff 
failed to prove that the individuals in question possessed apparent or actual 
authority to issue the promissory notes.252 
The Fourth Circuit began its analysis by noting that, while courts 
generally extend immunity to agents acting within their authority, the 
“FSIA . . . does not immunize an official who acts beyond the scope of his 
authority.”253  It observed that the FSIA mirrors federal common law 
dealing with derivative sovereign immunity, where courts “held 
[consistently] that the act of an agent beyond what he is legally empowered 
to do is not binding upon the government.”254  The Fourth Circuit also 
noted that persons dealing with U.S. agents have a duty to determine if the 
agent has the requisite authority to bind the government255 and that the 
mere belief an agent has authority is insufficient.256 
The court then explicitly referenced both Phaneuf and First Fidelity, 
criticizing the Second Circuit’s determination as one made “without 
substantial explanation.”257  The Fourth Circuit reasoned that whether a 
third party reasonably believes that an agent is authorized to engage in a 
transaction is irrelevant when the state’s laws proscribe or do not authorize 
 
 247. 370 F.3d 392 (4th Cir. 2004). 
 248. Id. at 400. 
 249. See id. at 397. 
 250. Id. 
 251. Id. 
 252. Id. 
 253. Id. at 399. 
 254. Id. (citing The Floyd Acceptances, 74 U.S. 666, 676 (1869)); see also Allfreight 
Worldwide Cargo, Inc. v. Ethiopian Airlines Enter., 307 F. App’x 721, 724 (4th Cir. 2009) 
(noting that the court in Velasco recognized that foreign sovereign immunity is analogous to 
the United States’s sovereign immunity and the derivative immunity it extends to its 
contractors and agents). 
 255. Velasco, 370 F.3d at 399 (citing Fed. Ins. Corp. v. Merrill, 332 U.S. 380, 383–84 
(1947)) (“[A]nyone entering into an arrangement with the Government takes the risk of 
having accurately ascertained that he who purports to act for the Government stays within 
the bounds of his authority.”). 
 256. Id. 
 257. Id. at 400.  The court also cited to Storr v. National Defense Security Council of 
Indonesia, No. 95 CIV. 9663, 1997 WL 633405 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 14, 1997), which dealt with 
yet another plaintiff attempting to enforce these promissory notes. Id.  In that case, the court 
applied the doctrine of apparent authority, but ultimately concluded that the issuers of the 
notes lacked such authority to issue the notes and, moreover, that the plaintiffs had not 
fulfilled their required duty of inquiry. Id. at *3–4. 
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the action taken.258  Therefore, it concluded that “a foreign official’s 
manifestation of authority to bind the sovereign is insufficient,”259 
expressly adopting the majority rule requiring actual authority. 
Turning to the merits of the case, the court upheld the district court’s 
dismissal.260  It held that the NDSC Secretary General’s statements that he 
never signed letters of authorization undermined the letters Hartomo 
claimed empowered him to issue the promissory notes.261  Moreover, the 
court held that even if the letters were authentic, the Secretary General and 
the NDSC itself lacked the authority to issue promissory notes under 
Indonesian law.262  Specifically, the court noted that the NDSC was 
established in order to advise on national security and defense matters and 
that only the Ministry of Finance and Central Bank could incur debt on 
behalf of the government.263  Moreover, the court found that while 
Ambassadors could engage in commercial transactions in certain 
circumstances under Indonesian law, Mawardi never obtained the necessary 
authorization.264  Therefore, the court held that the issuance of the notes 
was not a “commercial activity of a foreign state which divest[ed] the 
NDSC or the Government of Indonesia of their sovereign immunity” and, 
consequently, that the case was properly dismissed.265 
3.  The Fifth Circuit 
Finally, the Fifth Circuit adopted the majority rule, as espoused by the 
Ninth and Fourth Circuits, in Dale v. Colagiovanni.266  The plaintiffs were 
receivers267 for a number of insurance companies, which were acquired and 
looted by a con artist, Martin Frankel, over a nine-year period.268  The 
plaintiffs alleged that Monsignor Emilio Colagiovanni, a member of the 
papal curia and president of the Monitor Ecclesiasticus Foundation (MEF), 
aided Frankel in these criminal activities.269  Specifically, they contended 
that Frankel pitched Colagiovanni a plan to create a charitable organization 
capitalized with $55 million, $50 million of which would be used for 
acquiring insurance companies and $5 million for charitable purposes.270  
Colagiovanni eventually allowed the MEF to serve as the settlor of record 
 
 258. Velasco, 370 F.3d at 400. 
 259. Id. 
 260. Id. at 402. 
 261. Id. at 401. 
 262. Id. 
 263. Id. 
 264. Id. at 401–02. 
 265. Id. at 402. 
 266. 443 F.3d 425 (5th Cir. 2006). 
 267. “A receiver is a neutral party appointed by the court to take possession of property 
and preserve its value for the benefit of the person or entity subsequently determined to be 
entitled to the property.” 75 C.J.S., supra note 37, Receivers § 1. 
 268. Colagiovanni, 443 F.3d at 426. 
 269. Id. at 426–27. 
 270. Id. at 427. 
2015] AGENCY AND FOREIGN SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY 1311 
for Frankel’s charitable front organization, the St. Francis of Assisi 
Foundation271 (SFAF). 
In 1999, the Mississippi Department of Insurance investigated Frankel’s 
insurance acquisitions in the state.272  In response, Frankel had SFAF 
purchase the trust that had participated in the investments, causing the 
Department of Insurance to call an emergency meeting.273  Colagiovanni 
attended this meeting and represented that “Vatican-related entities had 
contributed over $1 billion to SFAF.”274  Meanwhile, Frankel prepared to 
flee the country, and regulators in Mississippi and four other states froze his 
assets.275 
The plaintiff-receivers eventually filed suit against Colagiovanni and the 
Vatican in district court.  The defendants in turn filed a motion to dismiss 
on the grounds of foreign sovereign immunity.276  The plaintiffs countered 
that Colagiovanni had acted with actual and apparent authority in engaging 
in these fraudulent activities, exposing the Vatican to suit under the FSIA’s 
commercial activity exception.277  The district court agreed with the 
plaintiffs, denying the defendants’ motion based on the theory of apparent 
authority.278  The defendants appealed, arguing that apparent authority was 
insufficient to bind the Vatican under the FSIA.279 
The Fifth Circuit began its analysis280 by citing to the Ninth Circuit’s 
decision in Phaneuf for the proposition that the commercial activity 
exception “makes clear that the activity must be that ‘of the foreign 
state.’”281  It noted that this conclusion was bolstered by the Fourth 
Circuit’s utilization of precedent illustrating that foreign sovereign 
immunity extends to agents only when they are acting in an official 
capacity.282  Finally, the court rejected the plaintiffs’ reliance on two 
additional cases dealing with the judicial status of government 
“instrumentalities,” noting that the inquiries are “analytically distinct.”283  
Therefore, the court “agree[d] with the Fourth and Ninth Circuits that an 
agent’s acts conducted with the apparent authority of the state is insufficient 
to trigger the commercial exception to FSIA.”284 
 
 271. Id.  In other words, Frankel donated funds to the MEF, which would in turn be given 
to the SFAF. Id. 
 272. Id. 
 273. Id. 
 274. Id. 
 275. Id. 
 276. Id. at 428. 
 277. Id. 
 278. Id. 
 279. See id. 
 280. The district court declined to consider any issues of actual authority, and the Fifth 
Circuit consequently limited its review to a discussion of apparent authority. Id. at 428 n.1. 
 281. Id. at 428 (citing Phanuef v. Republic of Indonesia, 106 F.3d 302, 307–08 (9th Cir. 
1997)). 
 282. Id. at 429. 
 283. Id. 
 284. Id. 
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C.  Summarizing the Circuit Split 
Thus, one can plainly see that the circuits “have taken varying positions 
on whether—and if so, when—a foreign government may be bound on a 
theory of apparent authority.”285  Courts within the Second Circuit have 
generally applied the doctrine of apparent authority in determining whether 
a sovereign is bound by the actions of its agent.286  The Ninth, Fifth, and 
Fourth Circuits have, however, declined to apply the doctrine.  They have 
instead held that, based on the text of the FSIA as well as various policy 
considerations, only actual authority can serve to bind a sovereign to the 
actions of its agents.287 
III.  THE (IDEAL) RESOLUTION:  THE MAJORITY RULE(S) 
This part ultimately argues for the adoption of the majority rule in the 
context of sovereign debt litigation via congressional revision of the FSIA 
or, in the alternative, via judicial review.  Specifically, Part III.A discusses 
how the minority rule works to undermine one of the main purposes behind 
the FSIA, namely uniformity and predictability of decisions.  In a similar 
vein, Part III.B then examines how the minority view negatively impacts 
U.S. foreign relations.  Part III.C in turn argues that modern sovereign debt 
creditors neither require nor deserve the added protection of the equitable 
doctrine of apparent authority under the current sovereign immunity 
framework.  Part III.D then illustrates these concerns through the lens of the 
Themis Capital litigation originally discussed in Part I.D.  Finally, Part III.E 
proposes a statutory revision of the FSIA endorsing the majority view, or, 
failing such action, that the minority rule be explicitly overruled by the U.S. 
Supreme Court. 
A.  Applying the Equitable Doctrine of Apparent Authority 
to Sovereign Debt Disputes Undermines the Purpose of the FSIA 
The application of apparent authority in sovereign debt disputes serves to 
undermine one of the fundamental purposes of the FSIA, namely, 
uniformity and predictability of decisions in foreign sovereign immunity 
cases.288  As previously discussed, Congress intended the FSIA to function 
as a comprehensive framework, bringing consistency and predictability to 
actions involving claims of foreign sovereign immunity where there had 
previously been none.289 
 
 285. Themis Capital I, 881 F. Supp. 2d 508, 523 (S.D.N.Y. 2012). 
 286. Id. at 522–23 (citing Skanga Energy & Marine v. Arevenca S.A., 875 F. Supp. 2d 
264, 270 (S.D.N.Y. 2012); Bitumenes Orinoco, S.A. v. New Brunswick Power Holding 
Corp., No. 05 Civ. 9485(LAP), 2007 WL 485617 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 13, 2007)). 
 287. See id. at 523. 
 288. See supra Part I.B.4. 
 289. See Simon v. Republic of Hungary, 37 F. Supp. 3d 381, 408 (D.D.C. 2014) 
(discussing the general framework of the FSIA in the context of international treaties); H.R. 
REP. NO. 94-1487, at 7 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6604, 6606 (“A principal 
purpose of this bill is to transfer the determination of sovereign immunity from the executive 
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This professed statutory purpose is necessarily at odds with the 
application of the doctrine of apparent authority.  The doctrine is, by its 
very nature, based on notions of estoppel290 and requires determinations 
regarding not only the subjective beliefs of third parties, but also the 
reasonableness of such beliefs.291  Thus, decisions concerning the existence 
of apparent authority must necessarily be made on an ad hoc, case-by-case 
basis, involving substantial factual inquiry.292  Indeed, this is evidenced in 
the circuit court cases discussed in Part II, all of which entail complicated 
factual scenarios.293 
The use of such an ephemeral standard is manifestly contrary to the 
FSIA, considering that “uniformity of jurisprudence” was one of the prime 
motivations behind congress’s passage of the FSIA.294  This desirability for 
uniformity of decisions stems from the fact that “disparate treatment of 
cases involving foreign governments may have adverse foreign relations 
consequences.”295  Indeed, the FSIA was designed, in part, to do away with 
the “ambiguous and politically charged standards”296 which had governed 
foreign sovereign immunity prior to its enactment and produced disparate 
outcomes.  The application of an equitable doctrine requiring 
individualized, case-by-case analysis logically would work to decrease any 
uniformity of decisions, as well as to increase the very ambiguity the statute 
was designed to remedy. 
Application of actual authority likewise requires courts to make 
determinations on an individualized basis contrary to the aforementioned 
statutory scheme.297  But this contention overlooks the fact that actual 
authority is a relatively bright-line standard when compared to the doctrine 
of apparent authority.  Actual authority requires either express or implied 
 
branch to the judicial branch, thereby reducing the foreign policy implications of immunity 
determinations . . . .”). 
 290. See supra Part I.A.2. 
 291. See Smith v. Metro. Sch. Dist. Perry Twp., 128 F.3d 1014, 1033 (7th Cir. 1997) 
(observing that a multitude of factors applied in determining the reasonability of a student’s 
subjective belief on whether a school employee had apparent authority); United States v. 
McIntosh, 612 F.2d 835, 838 (4th Cir. 1979) (Phillips, J., concurring) (concluding that there 
was no basis for the existence of apparent authority in light of the subjective and objective 
factors applied); 1964 Realty LLC v. Consulate of the State of Qatar-New York, No. 14 Civ. 
6429, 2015 WL 5197327, at *12 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 4, 2015) (“Since the factual record is not 
sufficiently developed, the Court cannot determine whether Plaintiff’s reliance was 
reasonable.”); see also supra Part I.A.1. 
 292. See First Fidelity Bank v. Gov’t of Antigua & Barbuda, 877 F.2d 189, 197–99 (2d 
Cir. 1989) (Newman, J., dissenting) (noting that the majority’s rule requiring the application 
of apparent authority in turn necessitates adjudication on a case-by-case basis); 1964 Realty 
LLC, 2015 WL 5197327, at *12 (“Ultimately, the Second Circuit has stressed that 
‘reasonable reliance is often a question of fact for the jury rather than a question of law for 
the court.’”); Pittman, supra note 58, at 683–84 (discussing the difficult application of 
apparent authority within the context of the waiver exception to the FSIA). 
 293. For a detailed discussion of the factual circumstances of each case, see supra Part II. 
 294. Suter v. Munich Reinsurance Co., 223 F.3d 150, 159 (3d Cir. 2000). 
 295. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1487, at 13 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6604, 6611. 
 296. Republic of Austria v. Altmann, 541 U.S. 677, 699 (2004) (citations omitted). 
 297. See Pittman, supra note 58, at 681 (concluding that inquiries into actual authority 
also erode uniformity and predictability to an unacceptable degree). 
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authorization from a principal to an agent.298  In the context of foreign 
sovereign immunity claims, this generally necessitates that courts look to 
the law of the foreign sovereign to determine whether an agent was actually 
authorized to take the action in question.299  While this may entail some 
level of analysis, the evaluation of statutory text is a less circumstantial 
inquiry than asking whether an individual had subjective, reasonable beliefs 
concerning the existence of authority.300  The application of actual authority 
therefore strikes the proper balance in maintaining the uniformity of 
decisions under the FSIA, while maintaining the essence of the restrictive 
theory of sovereign immunity.301 
B.  Applying the Equitable Doctrine of Apparent Authority 
to Sovereign Debt Disputes Undermines the Maintenance 
of Harmonious International Relations 
The application of the doctrine of apparent authority also has serious 
ramifications for U.S. foreign relations.  Courts have long been cognizant of 
foreign policy concerns in the context of sovereign immunity claims.302  
These very concerns represent yet another fundamental reason for 
Congress’s passage of the FSIA.303 
The application of apparent authority to foreign sovereign immunity 
claims endangers this statutory purpose.  Most generally, the 
unpredictability of the doctrine could strain relations with foreign 
sovereigns, which would no longer be able to rely on U.S. courts for the 
 
 298. See supra Part I.A.2. 
 299. See, e.g., Themis Capital I, 881 F. Supp. 2d 508, 520–21 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) 
(concluding that the court would evaluate whether the agents in question were vested with 
the actual authority by looking to the law of the DRC). 
 300. See Adam F. Hulbig, Aquamar v. Del Monte Fresh Produce:  Expanding the Scope 
of Ambassadors’ Rights Under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 25 N.C. J. INT’L L. & 
COM. REG. 597, 618 (2000) (determining that a better rule for regulating the waivers of 
sovereign immunity would closely examine local law regulating an Ambassador’s actions); 
see also Republic of Benin v. Mezei, No. 06 Civ. 870, 2010 WL 3564270, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. 
Sept. 9, 2010) (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 44.1) (“Matters of foreign law are questions of law for 
the court.”). But cf. Aquamar S.A. v. Del Monte Fresh Produce N.A., 179 F.3d 1279, 1298 
(11th Cir. 1999) (concluding that looking to the law of foreign sovereigns requires “lengthy, 
unpredictable, and frequently inconclusive inquiries” that undercut the utility of the FSIA); 
Pittman, supra note 58, at 688 (noting the dangers of “inexperienced courts attempt[ing] to 
interpret strange and foreign laws” in sovereign immunity cases). 
 301. The other side of the spectrum would be the application of the doctrine of inherent 
agency power, as was proposed in the dissenting opinion in First Fidelity. 877 F.2d 189, 
196–201 (2d Cir. 1989) (Newman, J., dissenting).  This would seem to require that acts of 
official government agents, such as Ambassadors, automatically bind sovereigns as long as 
those acts are generally within the scope of the position. See id.  This Note, however, focuses 
on the conflict between the two competing rules adopted by circuits and, thus, does not 
deliberate at length on this alternative proposition. 
 302. Verlinden B.V. v. Cent. Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 493 (1983) (citing Banco 
Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 423–25 (1964)) (“Actions against foreign 
sovereigns in our courts raise sensitive issues concerning the foreign relations of the United 
States, and the primacy of federal concerns is evident.”). 
 303. See USX Corp. v. Adriatic Ins. Co., 345 F.3d 190, 207 (3d Cir. 2003) (noting that 
the court should remain cognizant of the congressional goal of “avoiding impairing foreign 
relations” evidenced in the FSIA); see also supra Part I.B.4. 
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uniform adjudication of claims with an implicit guarantee of fair 
treatment.304  Moreover, the application of apparent authority spurs 
“potentially intrusive and resented inquiries of foreign governments” by 
third parties seeking to contract with government officials,305 as well as by 
domestic courts.306  This resentment would be magnified where, under the 
guise of apparent authority, courts in effect ignore the law of the foreign 
sovereign by applying equitable principles.307  Indeed, by requiring more 
intensive analysis of sovereign actions, the Second Circuit moves further 
from English and Canadian courts, which have been reluctant to interfere or 
undermine foreign sovereign functions.308  These unwarranted 
investigations, as well as consequent judicial determinations, thus strain 
U.S. diplomatic relations309 and intrude on the responsibilities and interests 
of the executive and legislative branches.310 
These intrusive inquiries would also have practical geopolitical results, 
amplifying their impact on U.S. interests abroad.  Specifically, they would 
spark a chilling effect on the provision of services to foreign nations as third 
party vendors become increasingly reluctant to extend credit to sovereigns 
 
 304. See H.R. REP. NO. 94-1487, at 7 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6604, 6606 
(“[The FSIA will] assur[e] litigants that these often crucial decisions are made on purely 
legal grounds and under procedures that insure due process.”); see also supra Part I.B.4. 
 305. First Fidelity, 877 F.2d at 199 (Newman, J., dissenting); Michael D. Anderson, First 
Fidelity Bank v. Government of Antigua & Barbuda, 877 F.2d 189 (2d Cir. 1989), 14 
SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L.J. 286, 296 (1990) (“[T]he decision may ultimately offend foreign 
sovereigns whose diplomatic missions to the United States will have to establish that they 
have the authority to act on behalf of their sovereign to complete even the most basic of day 
to day transactions.”). 
 306. See, e.g., Themis Capital I, 881 F. Supp. 2d 508 (S.D.N.Y. 2012); see also 
Vandenberg, supra note 59, at 740–41 (noting that these concerns regarding the issuance of 
judgments against state officials originally prompted courts to simply refuse to hear cases 
implicating sovereign states). 
 307. See Velasco v. Gov’t of Indonesia, 370 F.3d 392, 400 (4th Cir. 2004) (“Whether a 
third party reasonably perceives that the sovereign has empowered its agent to engage in a 
transaction, however, is irrelevant if the sovereign’s constitution or laws proscribe or do not 
authorize the agent’s conduct and the third party fails to make a proper inquiry.”). 
 308. Gathii, supra note 133, at 307–08; see also Vandenberg, supra note 59, at 740 (“In 
the legal realm it is clear that an adverse judgment entered in the courts of Nation A against 
Nation B or its high officials in their sovereign capacity could seriously affect Nation B’s 
conduct of internal matters.”). 
 309. Pittman, supra note 58, at 684; see also Gathii, supra note 133, at 308 (“[T]he 
extinction of any regard for the sovereign or regulatory functions of sovereigns in managing 
public functions such as refinancing sovereign debt results in an unbalanced projection of the 
authority of the United States over coequal sovereigns.”). 
 310. See Aquamar S.A. v. Del Monte Fresh Produce N.A., 179 F.3d 1279, 1298 (11th Cir. 
1999) (“A judicial inquiry into a foreign ambassador’s authority to perform traditional 
diplomatic functions can infringe upon the authority of our own executive and legislative 
branches to manage the foreign relations of the United States.”); see also Jackson v. People’s 
Republic of China, 794 F.2d 1490, 1495–96 (11th Cir. 1986) (noting that the U.S. 
government urged the court to refrain from deciding a bond default case implicating China, 
based on the country’s understanding of absolute sovereign immunity and its ability to 
undertake economic retaliations). But cf. Carolyn J. Brock, The Foreign Sovereign 
Immunities Act:  Defining a Role for the Executive, 30 VA. J. INT’L L. 795, 825–26 (1990) 
(concluding that the State Department has remained too active in sovereign immunity cases, 
contrary to the legislative intent of Congress in passing the FSIA). 
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in light of increased litigation uncertainty.311  This reluctance would have 
an especially strong impact on those states which can ill afford it, namely 
developing nations which already lack sufficient, affordable access to credit 
and services.312  Indeed, an increase in debt servicing costs, reflecting 
increased litigation volatility, would further destabilize the fragile economic 
situation in many of these troubled states.313  This destabilization would not 
only be a negative result in practical terms, but would also be contrary to 
the wider interest of the United States in maintaining global financial 
security.314 
C.  Sovereign Debt Creditors Do Not Need the Protection 
of the Equitable Doctrine of Apparent Authority 
This section illustrates that modern sovereign creditors are more than 
adequately protected under a sharply circumscribed doctrine of foreign 
sovereign immunity.  Part III.C.1 examines the gradual erosion of the 
doctrine of foreign sovereign immunity and how this has resulted in 
increased protections for sovereign creditors.  Part III.C.2 bolsters this 
argument by examining the practices of sovereign creditors, especially 
hedge funds, to conclude that these actors do not require, nor in fact 
deserve, the application of an equitable doctrine such as apparent authority. 
1.  The FSIA’s Circumscription of Foreign Sovereign Immunity 
Adequately Protects Sovereign Debt Creditors 
Modern creditors have already secured significant, and indeed sufficient, 
protections through the continued erosion of the doctrine of foreign 
sovereign immunity.315  At the most fundamental level, the FSIA alone 
represents a substantial level of protection for creditors via its codification 
of the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity, which was designed, in 
part, to protect U.S. creditors.316  Moreover, subsequent judicial decisions 
interpreting the FSIA, and especially its commercial activity exception, 
 
 311. See First Fidelity Bank v. Gov’t of Antigua & Barbuda, 877 F.2d 189, 199 (2d Cir. 
1989) (Newman, J., dissenting) (“The majority’s [opinion] . . . will, I fear, have the 
unfortunate consequences of making some vendors unwilling to extend credit for goods and 
services.”).  It could, however, be argued that the added protections of an equitable doctrine 
would actually spur the provision of such services.  But this assertion overlooks the fact that 
third party vendors will logically shy away from the perceived future costs of litigation 
generally, rather than entering into transactions betting on the outcome of future litigation. 
 312. See Gathii, supra note 133, at 310 (“Debt servicing, however, makes it extremely 
difficult for these countries to afford imports to generate growth or development.”). 
 313. See id. (“Investment in highly indebted countries is particularly risky as reflected by 
its highly speculative nature making it hard for indebted economies to benefit from it.”). 
 314. See Anne Krueger, Should Countries Like Argentina Be Able to Declare Themselves 
Bankrupt?, EL PAIS (Jan. 18, 2002), http://www.imf.org/external/np/vc/2002/011802.htm 
(“[If] a country’s debts become truly unsustainable, it is in everyone’s interest that the 
problem is addressed promptly and in an orderly way.”) [http://perma.cc/7CXQ-HGL3]. 
 315. See Broomfield, supra note 20, at 479–83 (noting the continued erosion of immunity 
under the FSIA, especially in relation to defaulting sovereign debtors). 
 316. See supra Part I.B.3. 
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have strengthened this baseline protection, largely by eroding the traditional 
immunity defenses available to sovereigns.317 
The single greatest example of this doctrinal attrition is the Supreme 
Court’s extension of the commercial activity exception to the refinancing of 
sovereign debt in Weltover.  In holding that the purpose behind a 
sovereign’s engagement in commercial bond markets is secondary to the 
commercial nature of the action, the Court sanctioned judicial review of an 
act which can plainly be seen as public in nature.318  For instance, in 
Weltover itself, the Argentine government had only turned to the bond 
market to alleviate a grievous foreign exchange shortage brought about by a 
domestic credit crisis.319  Thus, Argentina was not entering into commercial 
agreements merely to raise extra funds or invest abroad, but instead to 
stabilize its domestic economy as a whole, which could quite readily be 
viewed as a public act.320 
Moreover, lower courts have interpreted the Court’s ruling in Weltover in 
an even broader fashion.321  Take, for example, the Second Circuit’s 
conclusion that “a breach of a contractual agreement arising from the 
exercise of powers peculiar to sovereigns and not exercisable by private 
citizens does not immunize a foreign sovereign’s conduct.”322  In effect, 
this means “there is no room under New York law to make the point that a 
state has an inherent authority as a sovereign to act to safeguard vital 
interests even though such acts may modify or abrogate the rights of 
creditors under existing contracts.”323 
Other traditional protections available to sovereigns have likewise been 
eroded during this period.  For instance, the scope of the act of state 
doctrine, which historically barred judicial review of the lawfulness of a 
sovereign’s action within its territory, has been significantly narrowed in 
light of an emerging commercial activity exception.324  The principle of 
 
 317. See generally Gathii, supra note 133 (discussing the general collapse of sovereign 
immunity defenses and its impact on sovereign debt litigation); see also Aaron L. Warren & 
Ryan E. Avery, Investors of Prey:  Seeking Relief in Distressed Debt Markets, 18 U. MIAMI 
INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 213, 229–30 (2011) (highlighting that in attempting to define 
“commercial activity,” federal courts have chipped away at many traditional aspects of 
immunity); Yilin Ding, Absolute, Restrictive, or Something More:  Did Beijing Choose the 
Right Type of Sovereign Immunity for Hong Kong?, 26 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 997, 1019 
(2012) (concluding that the continued erosion of sovereign immunity in creditor-friendly 
nations has made it easier for creditors to bring suit). 
 318. See Gathii, supra note 133, at 307–08; Joseph W. Dellapenna, Refining the Foreign 
Sovereign Immunities Act, 9 WILLAMETTE J. INT’L L. & DISP. RESOL. 57, 155–56 (2001) (“[It 
is] impossible to pin down, depending as it does on the level of specificity at which one 
characterizes the act that determines whether it appears to be public or private, sovereign or 
commercial.”). 
 319. Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, Inc., 504 U.S. 607, 616–17 (1992). 
 320. See id. 
 321. Gathii, supra note 133, at 308. 
 322. Id. 
 323. Id. at 308–09. 
 324. See Joseph B. Frumkin, The Act of State Doctrine and Foreign Sovereign Defaults 
on United States Bank Loans:  A New Focus for a Muddled Doctrine, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 
469, 492 (1985) (“But just as certainly there is a range of governmental acts that might be 
characterized as commercial and yet involve serious noncommercial sovereign interests.”). 
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comity, which “limit[s] domestic jurisdiction to hear claims or apply 
[foreign] law,”325 has likewise been eroded via judicial review.326 
Therefore, modern creditors are already adequately protected in the field 
of sovereign debt via the continued erosion of the doctrine of foreign 
sovereign immunity.  Indeed, some have suggested that the current legal 
situation is too favorable to creditors.327  Regardless, the protections offered 
under the status quo illustrate that there is no need for imposition of the 
equitable doctrine of apparent authority in claims of sovereign immunity. 
2.  Sovereign Debt Creditors, Particularly Sophisticated Hedge Funds, 
Are Sufficiently Capable of Protecting Their Investors 
Moreover, modern sovereign creditors are not the sort of disadvantaged 
third parties envisioned by the doctrine of apparent authority.328  Certainly, 
there are unique risks in dealing with foreign sovereigns, in that the debtor 
may simply refuse to make payments on a loan or opportunistically 
default.329  But sovereign creditors today include some of the largest, and 
most sophisticated, financial and corporate institutions in the world.330  As 
sophisticated actors, these investors have the ability to adequately 
investigate and weigh the creditworthiness of sovereign debt.331  This 
capability, along with their relative economic clout, means that they cannot 
plead a lack of bargaining power with highly indebted sovereign states.332 
Moreover, on a more basic level, these investors are not involuntary 
creditors.  They have not been forced against their will into a financial 
arrangement, but, rather, have actively and carefully chosen to invest in 
certain sovereigns with full knowledge of their financial issues.333  In light 
of this assumption of risk,334 it simply does not follow that modern 
sovereign creditors need an equitable doctrine, such as apparent authority, 
to protect them. 
 
 325. Joel R. Paul, Comity in International Law, 32 HARV. INT’L L.J. 1, 2 (1991). 
 326. Gathii, supra note 133, at 307–08; see also Warren, supra note 317, at 232 (noting 
that the courts have effectively stripped foreign sovereigns of immunity by denying claims 
of comity). 
 327. See Gathii, supra note 133, at 319 (“New York law is too favorable to creditors.”). 
 328. See supra Part I.A.2. 
 329. Fisch & Gentile, supra note 124, at 1048–49.  “Opportunistic default” refers to 
situations where a debtor is not unable, but only unwilling, to make payments on its debt. Id. 
at 1044. 
 330. See id. at 1070 (“[Sovereign bond holders include] large commercial 
banks . . . [,] investment banks, insurance companies, pension funds, mutual funds, retail 
funds, hedge funds, nonfinancial companies, and retail investors.”). But cf. Gathii, supra 
note 133, at 267 (discussing the differing motivations of banking institutions, which, as 
repeat players, have greater incentives to act in the wider interest of the international 
community, and hedge funds, which have little or no pressure to refrain from litigating). 
 331. See Gathii, supra note 133, at 304. 
 332. Id. 
 333. See id. (“These holdouts are not in the position of involuntary lenders unaware of the 
fact that sovereign borrowers are often unable to bare the risk of borrowed monies.”). 
 334. See id. (“[I]t would therefore be reasonable to assume that these holdouts are often 
aware of the financial handicaps of sovereign debtors and by buying bonds underwritten by 
such indebted sovereigns they are assuming the risk of non-payment.”). 
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This conclusion is most clearly supported by the example of vulture 
funds.  These funds intentionally purchase debt issued by some of the most 
financially and politically distressed countries in the world.335  Indeed, they 
often target states that are parties to the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries 
Initiative (HIPCI), which was founded in 1996 by the World Bank in order 
to assist countries with unsustainable levels of foreign debt.336 
Moreover, the debt these funds purchase is often already in default, 
which explains why it trades at a significant discount from its face value.337  
But the funds then bring suit in creditor-friendly nations to enforce the full 
value of the defaulted debt, in effect seeking, and many times receiving, a 
windfall payment.338  Therefore, it can fairly be said that in targeting 
“sovereigns ravaged by civil war, political upheaval, and social chaos, 
vulture funds nonetheless enjoy court protection in seeking to gain a 
monetary judgment against both their interest and the interest of others 
through international markets.”339  It cannot be argued that such actors are 
in need of any additional judicial protections, especially those originally 
intended to benefit innocent third parties. 
D.  Themis Capital Illustrates Why the Majority Position Is Superior 
The decision in the second Themis case, imposing a roughly $100 million 
judgment against the DRC, is illustrative of many of these concerns.  The 
DRC is readily termed a failed or even nonexistent state.340  The country 
has been wracked by civil war for well over twenty years, and it 
consistently ranks last or next to last in failed state and development 
 
 335. See Warren, supra note 317, at 222–23 (“[V]ulture funds have become notorious for 
being litigious against not only distressed nations, but also against some of the poorest and 
most unstable economies in the world.”); see also supra Part I.D.3. 
 336. Broomfield, supra note 20, at 490–91.  Specifically, countries within the HIPCI 
work toward a completion stage by meeting identifiable financial benchmarks. Id. at 491.  
Once this completion stage is reached, the state receives complete and irrevocable debt 
relief. Id.  However, creditors retain the ability to litigate during this process and may refuse 
to cooperate with the HIPCI process. Id. at 492.  Countries within the HIPC represent the 
lowest echelon of developing states, but, nonetheless, vulture funds have targeted at least 
seventeen of them in litigation. Warren, supra note 317, at 225. 
 337. Warren, supra note 317, at 223. 
 338. Indeed, these funds have been phenomenally successful, at least in purely financial 
terms.  In the United Kingdom, vulture fund litigation cases have led to favorable judgments 
totaling $236.1 million on debt with a face value of only $65.3 million. Broomfield, supra 
note 20, at 504.  The returns have been even higher in the United States, with investors 
receiving favorable judgments totaling $659.4 million on debt with a face value of $195.9 
million. Id. at 507.  This figure represents almost 95 percent of claimed damages. Warren, 
supra note 317, at 229. 
 339. Warren, supra note 317, at 225; see also Broomfield, supra note 20, at 492 (“Vulture 
creditors therefore pose a special risk to countries undergoing the HIPC 
process. . . .  Creditor failure to take part in the HIPC Initiative (let alone their decision to 
litigate) could result in HIPC countries failing to reach debt sustainability, 
undermining . . . their movement toward[] economic prosperity.”). 
 340. See Jeffrey Herbst & Greg Mills, The Invisible State:  It’s Time We Admit the 
Democratic Republic of Congo Does Not Exist, FOREIGN POLICY (June 24, 2013), http:// 
www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/06/24/the_invisible_state [http://perma.cc/DTQ7-
VU73]. 
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indices.341  In finding that the DRC was bound to its debt obligations by its 
governmental official’s signing of the acknowledgement letter, the court 
imposed a weighty financial penalty on this already economically fragile 
state to the detriment of both the DRC and its other creditors, but to the 
benefit of opportunistic investors.342 
Moreover, the court’s findings regarding the existence of apparent 
authority were based on arguments that are, at best, colorable in either 
direction.343  Specifically, the court determined that it was “eminently 
reasonable” for the parties to have believed the signing of the 2003 letter 
was legitimate, regardless of DRC law governing the issue.344  But this 
conclusion seems to be an almost complete reversal from the first Themis 
litigation, where the court specifically noted the inherently suspicious 
circumstances of a situation in which, on “behalf of a cash-poor country, 
[government officials] renewed a financial obligation, now totaling 
approximately $80 million, against which claims were long barred by the 
statute of limitations, and evidently for no consideration whatsoever.”345  
The court also blithely ignored the duty of creditors to investigate any such 
suspicious situation under the duty of inquiry.346 
E.  Remedial Propositions 
Therefore, the Second Circuit’s rule requiring the application of the 
doctrine of apparent authority should be expressly rejected.  Because the 
split in authority essentially derives from a statutory provision of the 
FSIA,347 and because the legislative branch has a vested interest in 
regulating sovereign immunity cases,348 Congress itself should enact a 
statutory revision of the commercial activity exception to reflect a rejection 
of apparent authority.  In the alternative, however, considering the risk of 
congressional inaction or legislative capture, the Supreme Court should be 
prepared to grant certiorari and endorse the majority view as elucidated by 
 
 341. Id. 
 342. See supra Part I.D.4. 
 343. See supra Part I.D.4.  Indeed, it is also arguable that the court’s decision in regard to 
actual authority was similarly questionable.  Specifically, the court interpreted DRC law to 
require the approval of the entire cabinet of ministers only where there were “budgetary 
repercussions” to an action. See supra Part I.D.4.  The court then held that the signing of the 
acknowledgement letter had no budgetary repercussions and that, therefore, cabinet approval 
was not required. See supra Part I.D.4.  Not only does the court’s interpretation of DRC law 
itself seem conclusory, but the court’s holding also entirely ignores that the signing of the 
2003 acknowledgement letter left the DRC on the hook for $100 million.  If that cannot be 
said to be a “budgetary repercussion,” then the author would question what could or would 
fit the court’s definition. 
 344. Themis Capital II, 35 F. Supp. 3d 457, 479 (S.D.N.Y. 2014); see also supra Part 
I.D.4. 
 345. See supra Part I.D.4. 
 346. See supra Part I.D.4. 
 347. See supra Part II.B.1–3. 
 348. See supra note 310. 
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the Ninth, Fourth, and Fifth circuits, expressly overruling the Second 
Circuit’s application of apparent authority as laid out in First Fidelity.349 
CONCLUSION 
While Loydstone Jacobs’s Antiguan-casino venture may be long past, the 
circuit split regarding the application of agency principles to claims of 
foreign sovereign immunity remains in force.  The Second Circuit continues 
to adhere to the minority view as elucidated in First Fidelity, which holds 
that apparent authority is sufficient to bind a sovereign to a transaction for 
the purposes of the commercial activity exception.  The Ninth, Fifth, and 
Fourth Circuits, however, steadfastly hold that only actual authority is 
sufficient to bind a sovereign. 
In light of the foregoing analysis, it is evident that the minority rule 
requiring the application of the doctrine of apparent authority to claims of 
foreign sovereign immunity should be rejected, at least in the context of 
sovereign debt disputes.  This is primarily because of the troubling doctrinal 
implications entailed in its utilization—that it would result in increased 
unpredictability of decisions, as well as imperil U.S. foreign relations.350  
But secondary concerns likewise push against endorsing the minority 
position.  Most modern sovereign creditors are already adequately protected 
via the current, eroded doctrine of foreign sovereign immunity.351  
Moreover, these same creditors are sophisticated investors, who have 
knowingly assumed the risk of investing in sovereign states—and often 
troubled ones at that.352  Therefore, they do not require the protection of an 
equitable doctrine, which was originally intended to assist disadvantaged 
third parties.353 
In sum, Congress should revise the FSIA to explicitly disavow the 
minority position in this context.  If, however, Congress proves unable or 
unwilling to act, the Supreme Court itself should overrule the minority 
view. 
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